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DESIGNING BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENTS FOR 
ENHANCED CLIMATE ACTION 
The Paris Agreement advances a heterogeneous approach to international climate cooperation.  
Such an approach may be undermined by leakage—the displacement of emissions from states with 
more to less stringent climate policy constraints.  Border carbon adjustments (BCAs) offer a 
promising response to leakage, but they also raise concerns about their compatibility with 
international trade law.  This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of border carbon 
adjustments and proposes a way to design them that balances legal, administrative, and 
environmental considerations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement,1 the international community has formally endorsed a 
transition towards a more fragmented, domestically driven architecture for international climate 
cooperation.  Although the treaty has broadened participation in the collective effort to address 
climate change, Parties have made pledges to reduce greenhouse gases that differ vastly in timing, 
nature, and scope.2  Given the modest provisions on compliance and enforcement in the Paris 
climate regime,3 moreover, these pledges may see uneven implementation and outcomes. 
Meanwhile, the cost of climate action is expected to increase as abatement measures 
gradually extend beyond low-hanging fruit to ensure a broader de-carbonization of the economy 
over the second half of this century.4  While the earlier Kyoto Protocol formally legitimized an 
asymmetry of effort between developed and developing states, the new architecture now requires 
all Parties to contribute towards common objectives in accordance with vastly divergent national 
circumstances.  Its progressive ambition and transparency frameworks may help reach policy 
convergence in the long term,5 but in the near future differences in the stringency of domestic 
climate policies are likely to persist or even increase.  In addition, participation in the international 
climate regime cannot be taken for granted, as evidenced by the intended withdrawal of the United 
States—the largest economy and historical emitter of greenhouse gases.6 
Uncertainty and asymmetry will therefore continue to define collective climate action.  
Concerns about impacts on domestic economies are also likely to increase over time as the 
                                                 
1 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, art. 2(1), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
2 See, e.g., Pieter Pauw et al., Beyond Headline Mitigation Numbers: We Need More Transparent and Comparable 
NDCs to Achieve the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 147 CLIMATIC CHANGE 23, 24 (2018); Edward J. Balistreri 
et al., Carbon Policy and the Structure of Global Trade, 41 WORLD ECON. 194 (2018). 
3 The Paris Agreement puts in place a committee to facilitate implementation and promote compliance “that shall be 
expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive.”  
Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 15(2), emphasis added. 
4 Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(1). 
5 For a discussion of the Paris Agreement’s “ratchet mechanism,” see Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change 
Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 288, 306–307 (2016). 
6 United Nations, Paris Agreement, United States Communication (Aug. 4, 2017) 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.464.2017-Eng.pdf. 
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financial and political consequences of climate change policies become more significant.7  Policies 
that generate an explicit carbon price, in particular, may further concerns about the comparability 
of climate change mitigation efforts across jurisdictions and strengthen calls to safeguard a level 
playing field for vulnerable industries exposed to international competition.8   
But uneven climate change mitigation efforts may also have environmental consequences. 
Above all, they can favor displacement of production, investment, and fuel consumption—and 
thus, inevitably, of emissions—from regions with more stringent carbon constraints to those with 
less climate ambition.9  Such effects—collectively referred to as “leakage”—have been discussed 
as part of climate policy initiatives, such as the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System, 
proposed federal climate legislation in the United States, and the forthcoming national carbon 
market in China.  Thus far, existing policy frameworks have mostly addressed the risk of leakage 
with purely domestic measures to alleviate the impacts of climate action.10 
A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that these measures have not performed 
as intended.11  As Parties to the Paris Agreement engage in progressively more ambitious climate 
mitigation efforts, the need for more effective approaches to counteract leakage will become more 
acute. 
Border carbon adjustments (BCAs) are a promising way to do that.  Repeatedly proposed 
but rarely implemented, BCAs seek to achieve symmetry in the treatment of domestic and foreign 
products by including imports in, or exempting exports from, the scope of a climate policy 
constraint.12  Calls for the introduction of BCAs first originated in industrialized countries, 
primarily out of concern about the lack of comparable climate commitments in developing 
countries and U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.13  More recently, BCAs have been 
invoked by both developed and developing countries, again partly in reaction to the intended exit 
of the United States from the Paris Agreement. 
Unlike earlier—and mostly unsuccessful—efforts to introduce BCAs, these latest appeals 
occur in a very different context of growing policy heterogeneity, an expectation of universal and 
increasingly stringent climate action, and greater willingness in some countries to adopt 
                                                 
7 See Balistreri et al., Carbon Policy and the Structure of Global Trade, supra note 2; Clara Brandi, Trade Elements 
in Countries’ Climate Contributions under the Paris Agreement, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 6 (2017). 
8 See, e.g., Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, What is the Impact of Carbon Pricing on Competitiveness? (2016), 
1. 
9 See generally John Ward et al., Carbon Leakage: Theory, Evidence and Policy Design (Partnership for Market 
Readiness Technical Note 11, 2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/138781468001151104/pdf/100369-
NWP-PUBLIC-ADD-SERIES-Partnership-for-Market-Readiness-technical-papers-Box393231B.pdf. 
10 Id. at 37–41. Such domestic measures include output-based rebates, free allocation of emission rights, and full 
exemption of affected emitters, see infra Part III.C.  
11 See, e.g., Sander de Bruyn et al., Calculation of Additional Profits of Sectors and Firms from the EU ETS 2008-
2015 (2016) (documenting additional windfall profits made by industries covered by the EU ETS); Karsten Neuhoff 
et al., Inclusion of Consumption of Carbon Intensive Materials in Emissions Trading: An Option for Carbon Pricing 
Post-2020 3 (2016) (arguing that free allocation mutes the carbon price, as well as the uptake of mitigation options in 
the sectors receiving allowances). 
12 Samuel Kortum & David Weisbach, The Design of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices, 70 NAT’L TAX J. 421, 
422 (2017). 
13 In 2001, the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, endangering its entry into force and prompting 
international censure. See Joanna Depledge, Against the Grain: The United States and the Global Climate Change 
Regime, 17 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 11, 27 (2005). This subsequently gave rise to a discussion of border 
adjustments against the U.S., see Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without the 
USA: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 289 (2005). 
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protectionist trade measures.14  Taken together, these trends signal both the greater urgency of—
and greater challenges for—ambitious climate action compared to the past.  As recent 
breakthroughs in climate cooperation at the international level prove highly vulnerable to national 
pushback, and the window to achieve the temperature stabilization goals in the Paris Agreement 
rapidly closes, effective policy options will both have to better withstand domestic pressures and 
encourage climate action by all countries.   
To date, however, BCAs have not been implemented on any meaningful scale. Although 
they have featured in a number of policy proposals and draft legislation, including major federal 
bills in the United States, only California has so far actually implemented a BCA on electricity 
imports from neighbouring states.15  Legal uncertainties, technical challenges of implementation, 
and fear of political backlash have thus far deterred the adoption of BCAs.   
These barriers now face a rapidly evolving legal and policy landscape, creating a window 
of opportunity for renewed efforts to adopt BCAs.  First, trade relations are fraying due to 
escalating tariff conflicts and gridlock in the World Trade Organization (WTO), potentially 
lowering earlier sensitivity against trade-related environmental protection measures.  Second, an 
agreed climate regime is now firmly in place, easing concerns that BCAs might disrupt delicate 
climate negotiations.  Third, technological conditions have changed. The availability and quality 
of emissions data, methodologies for measuring emissions, and administrative and technical 
capacity for implementation have greatly improved.16 
What the evolving policy context has not yet resolved, however, are the international legal 
concerns associated with the adoption of BCAs.  These include, in particular, fears of trade 
retaliation and challenges before the WTO dispute settlement system, as well questions about the 
compatibility of BCAs with the international climate change regime.  Such concerns have stymied 
consideration of BCAs in the past, and they continue to be invoked by opponents of unilateral 
climate action.   
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of BCAs that addresses these legal 
uncertainties and advances a proposal for a BCA design that balances legal, administrative, and 
environmental considerations. It does so in five parts:  Part III traces relevant developments in 
climate and trade policy.  Part IIII explores the conceptual underpinnings and economic rationales 
for BCAs, and Part IV reviews past BCA proposals.  Part V offers a thorough analysis of legal 
considerations affecting BCAs under international trade and climate change law.  Part VI, finally, 
draws on the insights of this analysis to formulate guidelines for the design and implementation of 
BCAs.  It describes a number of substantive elements and procedural steps that states can use to 
help harness the climate benefits of BCAs while limiting their technical complexities and legal 
risks.    
                                                 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 Importantly, a growing number of multi-regional input-output databases contain detailed information on the 
greenhouse gas footprint of traded goods and effective carbon rates in different sectors, see, e.g., Martin van de Lindt 
et al., Carbon Emission Mitigation by Consumption-Based Accounting and Policy: Final Project Report 28 (2017); 
Kirsten S. Wiebe et al., Policies and Consumption-Based Carbon Emissions from a Top-Down and a Bottom-Up 
Perspective, 7 LOW CARBON ECONOMY 21, 23 (2016); and Kirsten S. Wiebe & Norihiko Yamano, Estimating CO2 
Emissions Embodied in Final Demand and Trade Using the OECD ICIO 2015, OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND 
INDUSTRY WORKING PAPERS 2016/05 (2016); ongoing activities such as the recent Carbon Loophole project likewise 
improve transparency of carbon embedded in traded goods, see Daniel Moran et al., The Carbon Loophole in Climate 
Policy: Quantifying the Embodied Carbon in Traded Products (2018), https://buyclean.org/media/2016/12/The-
Carbon-Loophole-in-Climate-Policy-Final.pdf. 
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II. THE EVOLVING CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND TRADE COOPERATION 
Recent developments in climate cooperation have not only altered the political context for 
measures affecting international trade, but have also added saliency to the debate on BCAs.  In 
December 2015, in Paris, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) adopted a new international agreement to govern global climate action after the Kyoto 
Protocol’s second commitment period elapses in 2020.  The Paris Agreement entered into force in 
November 2016, following a historically swift ratification by a critical mass of countries (55 
countries representing at least 55 percent of global emissions).17  It signals an important 
breakthrough for international climate cooperation, following many years of impasse over 
ostensibly irreconcilable domestic interests. 
The Agreement aims to strengthen the global response to climate change by, inter alia, 
limiting the global average temperature increase to “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels18 
and calling for global greenhouse gas emissions to peak “as soon as possible.”19 Central to the 
achievement of this objective is a bottom-up system of national climate pledges, dubbed Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs).  The content, scope, and ambition levels of these NDCs are 
largely up to each country to individually determine.  This flexibility represents a double-edged 
sword, however: it was an indispensable prerequisite for securing widespread participation in the 
post-2020 climate regime—for the first time, an international treaty incorporates mitigation 
contributions from developing countries—but offers little guarantee that the aggregate country 
pledges will stave off the most catastrophic climate change impacts.20 
Unlike the UNFCCC21 and the Kyoto Protocol,22 the Paris Agreement does not reference 
trade specifically.  Nevertheless, achieving its goals is likely to affect the global trade system both 
directly and indirectly.  Indirectly, taking the required degree of action will mean a major overhaul 
of domestic policy towards lower-emitting production and consumption processes.  This could be 
brought about, for instance, through the adoption of new regulations and standards; the 
introduction of market signals and mechanisms such as carbon pricing; and by scaling up 
investments in climate technology research and development.  Even where they are primarily 
intended as domestic measures, such interventions can have significant cross-border consequences 
as they affect products and services imported and exported by countries.  Indeed, global trade in 
environmental goods is already estimated at almost $1 trillion annually and growing.23  
In addition to domestic policies with indirect trade effects, promoting the goals of the Paris 
Agreement could involve the adoption of numerous measures with direct trade implications, such 
as removal or reduction of tariffs on environmental goods and services, a reform of fossil fuel 
                                                 
17 Paris Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 21(1). 
18 Paris Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 2(1). 
19 Id. art. 4(1). 
20 See Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well Below 2°C, 354 
NATURE 631, 631 (2016) (suggesting that the intended NDCs submitted ahead of Paris “collectively lower greenhouse 
gas emissions compared to where current policies stand, but still imply a median warming of 2.6–3.1 degrees Celsius 
by 2100”). 
21 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107, art. 3(5) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
22 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22, art. 2(3). 
23 U.S. Trade Representative, Environmental Goods Agreement, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-
initiatives/environmental-goods-agreement. 
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subsidies and subsidy schemes for renewable energy technologies, or participation in cooperative 
approaches under a provision of the Paris Agreement24 that allows trading mitigation outcomes 
between countries.25 
 The Paris Agreement’s universal reach, long-term goals, and dynamic ambition mechanism 
suggest that these and other climate actions will increase over time, eventually leading to a 
convergence of different countries’ climate policies. At the same time, with countries beginning 
from very different starting points and political realities, it is likely that efforts will remain 
heterogeneous and asymmetrical for the foreseeable future. The built-in flexibility and bottom-up 
nature of the new international climate regime are well-suited to allow certain actors to move ahead 
with climate action even where others can, or will, not do the same.  Following the announcement 
of the United States’ intended withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, for example, key parties such 
as China, the EU, and India were quick to reaffirm their commitment to move ahead with the deal’s 
implementation.26 Other countries, like Brazil or Australia, may however follow the  example of 
the United States. 
Such asymmetrical climate action may have its own trade implications.  In particular, there 
have been growing signs that some countries see trade measures, such as BCAs, as one way to 
“level the playing field” between those that intend to uphold or increase their climate ambition and 
those opting for less stringent climate policy constraints.  Following U.S. President Donald 
Trump’s election, for instance, the Mexican Undersecretary for Environmental Policy and 
Planning noted that carbon tariffs “are an option,”27 echoing mention of BCAs in Mexico’s 
intended NDC as a possible condition for sustained domestic climate action.28  To the north of the 
United States, Catherine McKenna, Canada’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change, 
suggested that BCAs deserve attention and should be considered, ideally through the WTO.29  In 
Europe, French President Emmanuel Macron has characterized a carbon tax at the EU’s borders 
as “indispensable” for a fair ecological transition.30 
                                                 
24 Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6.2 & 6.4. 
25 These examples are drawn from: Susanne Droege et al., The Trade System and Climate Action: Ways Forward 
under the Paris Agreement, 13 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 195, 219 (2017); Brandi, supra note 7; and Rana Elkahwagy et 
al., UNFCCC Nationally Determined Contributions: Climate Change and Trade (2017). 
26 Somini Sengupta et al., As Trump Exits Paris Agreement, Other Nations Are Defiant, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 1, 2017).  
At the July 2017 meeting of the Group of 20 (G20) in Hamburg, the U.S. also found itself largely isolated.  While the 
G20 Declaration took note of the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, the rest of 
the G20 confirmed that the Agreement is “irreversible” and reiterated their commitment both to the deal and to past 
pledges related to climate finance for developing countries.  G20, G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Shaping an 
Interconnected World (July 7–8, 2017), ¶¶ 24–25. 
27 See Coral Davenport, Diplomats Confront New Threat to Paris Climate Pact: Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
18, 2016).. 
28 In its NDC, Mexico included a conditional emissions reduction pledge of 40 percent, subject to inter alia the creation 
of a BCA.  See Mexico, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 2 (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Mexico/1/MEXICO%20INDC%2003.30.2015
.pdf.. 
29 See Ben Garside, Canada’s Environment Minister Calls for Consideration of Carbon Border Measures, CARBON 
PULSE (Oct. 11, 2017). 
30 Government of France, Initiative pour l’Europe: Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, 
démocratique (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-
emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique (“Il nous faut aussi, pour réussir cette stratégie, 
assurer pour nos industriels les plus exposés à la mondialisation d’être sur un pied d’égalité avec les entreprises, les 
industries concurrentes venant d’autres régions du monde qui n’ont pas les mêmes exigences environnementales. C’est 
pour cela qu’il nous faut une taxe aux frontières de l’Europe sur le carbone, c’est indispensable.”). 
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With its conscious decision to decentralize climate cooperation through reliance on 
nationally determined climate pledges, the Paris Agreement could be seen to legitimize 
heterogeneous climate action, undermining the political case for BCAs by suggesting that they are 
unilateral measures that contravene the cooperative spirit of the international climate regime and 
infringe on other countries’ flexibility to choose a level of climate ambition reflective of their 
domestic circumstances.  At the same time, however, the need to scale up climate ambition is a 
recurrent theme throughout the Paris Agreement, starting with its temperature stabilization 
objectives and the ongoing, regular process to increase action by all countries through the global 
stocktake and the requirement of progressively more ambitious NDCs.  As will be shown in the 
next section, BCAs can help sustain and increase domestic climate ambition while also 
incentivizing other countries to take comparable action, thereby furthering the goals of the Paris 
Agreement.  Also, BCAs can be designed and introduced in an inclusive and transparent way, 
better aligning with the cooperative character of the Paris Agreement.31 
Recent developments in international trade policy have also heightened the salience of 
BCAs. Like international climate policy, international trade, and trade policy, have recently been 
in flux.  WTO negotiations have largely stalled, casting doubt on the future of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA).32  In parallel, recent years have seen a surge in regional trade 
agreements (RTAs),33 including so-called “mega-regional” trade agreements, which involve 
nations responsible for a substantial share of world trade, and which have an expansive scope that 
goes beyond market access to cover issues such as regulatory coherence.  Similar to the WTO, 
however, the future of several such agreements is uncertain.34  Another important development 
with trade policy implications is the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU, potentially 
necessitating the renegotiation of over 750 bilateral trade agreements.35  These developments 
should be seen in the context of growing dissatisfaction with globalization and rising inequality, 
and a sense, particularly in the developed world, that “many are being left behind.”36 
Against this backdrop of slowing progress and even partial setbacks in the liberalization of 
international trade, a surge in nationalist sentiment has given rise to protectionist agendas in a 
number of countries.  Concerns about continued offshoring of production, coupled with persistent 
trade deficits, have translated into populist support for economic retrenchment.  These sentiments 
are exacerbated by rising inequality and dissatisfaction with the status quo in a growing number 
of countries.37  Overall, current public opinion seems to be more sensitive to the risks of 
                                                 
31 See infra Part VI.F. 
32 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(15)/45-WT/L/980 ¶ 30 (2015). 
33WTO, Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm. 
34 Negotiations on two such agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), were impacted by the outcome of the 2016 U.S. elections. Negotiations on the TPP 
continued without the U.S., resulting in signature of a Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) in March 2018, whereas the TTIP was abandoned for the time being, see Matthew P. Goodman, 
From TPP to CPTPP, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Mar. 8, 2018); Richard Bravo & Julia 
Chatterley, Trump is Willing to Reopen TTIP Amid EU-US Trade Dispute, Ross Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2018). 
35 Paul McClean, After Brexit: The UK Will Need to Renegotiate at Least 759 Treaties, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 30, 
2017). 
36 OECD, MAKING TRADE WORK FOR ALL, supra, n.13, at 4. 
37 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), MAKING TRADE WORK FOR ALL 4–7 
(2017). 
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international trade than to its benefits.38  Emboldened by these trends, some governments have 
embraced restrictions on trade in goods and services that would not have appeared viable only a 
decade ago.   
Acting on one of his campaign promises to renegotiate multilateral trade agreements and 
end trade practices that he perceived to be unfair or detrimental to the United States,39 President 
Trump ordered tariff increases on hundreds of billions’ worth of imported goods from major trade 
partners such as China, Mexico, Canada, and the EU, including on washing machines, solar cells, 
soya beans, steel, and aluminum.40  With these actions, the United States unleashed what 
commentators have described as a full-blown “trade war.”41  Affected trade partners sharply 
censored the U.S. measures and announced retaliatory tariff increases against U.S. goods, 
prompting an escalation of the trade conflict42 as well as urgent efforts at reaching a negotiated 
solution.   
While the final outcome of these trade hostilities has yet to be seen, it is nonetheless clear 
that trade relations between major economies and the United States are as frayed as they have not 
been in a long time. Ironically, this deterioration of trade relations could expand the political 
opportunity space for trade-related environmental policy measures such as BCAs: with countries 
already engaged in unilateral trade restrictions, BCAs may lose some of their former political 
sensitivity.43 At the same time, the rejection of global integration and multilateralism may also 
strengthen the free-rider dynamic that has impeded climate cooperation in the past, further 
underscoring the value of BCAs as a tool to both address carbon leakage and incentivize other 
countries to engage in the collective climate effort. How BCAs achieve these ends is explained in 
the next section. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENTS 
A. Rationale and Purpose 
As mentioned earlier, BCAs are an effective policy option to alleviate carbon leakage, which can 
occur whenever only a subset of jurisdictions takes ambitious climate action.  Carbon leakage 
                                                 
38 See Bruce Stokes, The Public’s Mixed Views on Trade, Presentation at the OECD Trade Communications 
Conference, Paris, France (Apr. 23, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/tad/events/trade-comms-conf.htm. 
39 Corey R. Lewandowski, Trump’s Pro-American Trade Policy Is Just What He Promised, THE HILL (Mar. 7, 2018). 
40 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar 
Cell Manufacturers (Jan. 22, 2018); The White House, Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into 
the United States (Mar. 8, 2018); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Under Section 301 Action, USTR Releases 
Proposed Tariff List on Chinese Products (April 3, 2018). In doing so, the Administration has exercised statutory 
authorities under the Trade Expansion Act, § 232, Pub. L. No. 87–794, 19 U.S.C. Ch. 7 (1962), and the U.S. Trade 
Act § 301, Pub. L. No. 93–618, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1974). 
41 Ana Swanson, U.S. and China Brace for Impact as Tariff Deadlines Expire, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2018, at B1 (citing 
a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, according to which the U.S. “has launched the biggest trade war 
in economic history so far”); see also Steve Holland & David Lawder, Trade Dispute Escalates as Trump Threatens 
$100 Billion More in China Tariffs, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2018). 
42 For instance, China swiftly responded to the tariff increases with commensurate, “dollar-for-dollar” tariffs on U.S. 
goods, whereupon the U.S. Administration has threatened to impose an additional tariffs on $200 billion worth of 
Chinese goods, see Swanson, U.S. and China Brace for Impact, supra note 41. 
43 Michael A. Mehling et al., Beat Protectionism and Emissions at a Stroke, 559 NATURE 321 (2018). 
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matters, because it threatens to undermine aggregate emission reductions and the environmental 
effectiveness of collective climate action.  It can occur through a number of channels, of which 
three are of particular importance: changes in production cost; changes in capital flows; and 
changes in fossil fuel consumption.44  Attention has mostly focused on the first channel, where 
differences in production cost cause substitution of goods from jurisdictions that impose carbon 
constraints with goods produced elsewhere.  Domestic emissions will fall in the jurisdiction with 
carbon constraints, but part of the reductions will only occur because production—and related 
emissions—shift to jurisdictions with less rigorous or no mitigation measures.  When climate 
policies affect the return on capital, they can also redirect investment to more profitable 
opportunities elsewhere, and that, in turn, can result in new or replaced production capacities that 
emit more carbon than allowed domestically.  Finally, leakage can occur through displacement of 
fossil fuels, as reduced demand due to climate policies exerts pressure on energy prices and thereby 
stimulates demand elsewhere.45 
To effectively address leakage, BCAs therefore have two central functions: to “level the 
playing field” among competing producers, and to create political leverage for more climate action 
across countries.  Both help avoid the foregoing leakage effects, but—as discussed below—they 
cannot always be separated in practice. 
Mitigation policies introduced in a country that is highly integrated in international goods 
and capital markets will have an impact on trade flows, especially if the country is a large producer, 
and on domestic firms’ competitiveness if trade partners in other countries face less stringent or 
no carbon constraints.46  A regulatory burden on domestic products, be it in the form of an explicit 
carbon price from a tax or an emissions trading system, or through other forms of climate 
regulation, places competitive pressure on producers if they are unable to pass through the 
attendant costs.  Imported goods sold in the domestic market can then gain market share if they 
are cheaper because of weaker or absent carbon constraints.  Likewise, the international market 
share of domestic producers can decline if competitors in those markets do not face a similar 
mitigation burden. BCAs can counteract both impacts by levelling the playing field. 
As noted above, the second main objective of BCAs is to exert political pressure on climate 
laggards, as they can be used as a lever to induce climate action of trade partners.47  This rationale 
is frequently explained in terms of game theory: free riding on efforts of others is an established 
risk when managing the global commons.48  In the theoretical literature, a trade sanction is 
recommended to induce cooperative behavior from countries that would otherwise not engage.49  
Also, sanctions have been discussed as a means to ensure compliance with an international 
agreement.50  Under an arrangement such as the Paris Agreement, even countries that have pledged 
mitigation efforts will have an incentive to default on their commitments if others are taking action.  
Here, too, the benefits from mitigation will still accrue to all countries equally, whether they 
comply with their pledges or not.  If a country fails to deliver on its abatement targets, a sanction 
                                                 
44 Julia Reinaud, Issues Behind Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heavy Industry, IEA INFORMATION 
PAPER 3–4 (2008). 
45 Ward et al., Carbon Leakage, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
46 See generally Joseph E. Aldy, Frameworks for Evaluating Policy Approaches to Address the Competitiveness 
Concerns of Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions, HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (2016). 
47 This was proposed, for instance, by Nobel Prize Laureate Joseph Stiglitz; see Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for 
Global Warming, 3 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 3 (2006). 
48 Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1990). 
49 Nordhaus, Climate Clubs, supra note 70, at 1347. 
50 Id. at 1367. 
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could therefore help secure compliance.  While BCAs are not sanctions in any formal sense, they 
can still exert political leverage on laggard countries. Because the imposition of a BCA will be 
conditioned on climate performance, it can shift the strategic calculation of such countries and 
compel them to adopt more robust climate action as a way to avoid the sanction.  
To achieve this twin objective, a BCA needs to be carefully designed, considering the 
specific propensity of a given economic context for carbon leakage, but also in light of legal and 
political barriers.51  Still, even a well-designed BCA may face accusations of pursuing protectionist 
ends.  As such, BCAs risks resuscitating the long-standing debate on green protectionism.52  That 
debate has revolved around allegations that industrialized countries resort to environmental 
standards and other environmental policy measures as a means of limiting imports from developing 
countries. Given their environmental rationale, BCAs – which are based on the processes and 
production methods applied in the producing country53 – could therefore be perceived as a 
disguised protectionist tool.  Even where an implementing country successfully navigates the 
complexities of calculating, operationalizing, and ensuring the legal robustness of a BCA, it will 
probably not succeed at convincing all trade partners of the usefulness and justification of the 
measure.  Political rhetoric in countries whose exports are affected by the BCA will not linger on 
design technicalities, but quickly pivot to arguments of equity and retaliatory measures. 
All that underscores the importance of process and communication in the context of BCAs.  
Particular attention has to be accorded to the environmental objectives of the BCA, which should 
be clearly identified and leave no doubt that they exclude protectionist motivations.  Similarly, the 
process of adopting a BCA should be as transparent as possible to trade partners, and seek 
inclusiveness with respect to affected stakeholders.  Incorporating the discussion of BCAs in 
multilateral negotiations—whether on climate change or international trade—may prove the safest 
way to ensure these considerations are observed. Along with the legal requirements established in 
Part V as well as the theoretical and practical features described in the next sections, such political 
considerations guide the design recommendations set out in Part VI. 
B. Definition and Conceptual Boundaries 
In  order to prevent carbon leakage, BCAs seek to alleviate the negative impacts of uneven climate 
efforts by levelling the resulting carbon constraint at the border.  In their most elementary form, 
they take the shape of a tariff or other fiscal measure applied to imported goods from countries 
that have not taken comparable climate action.54  Much of the political debate on BCAs has focused 
on border adjustments applied to imports in conjunction with domestic carbon pricing instruments, 
such as a carbon tax or an emissions trading system.  In the case of a carbon tax, a BCA on imports 
would charge a covered imported good the equivalent of its carbon tax liability had it been 
produced domestically.  In the case of an emissions trading system, a BCA would require the 
                                                 
51 See generally Aaron Cosbey et al., Developing Guidance for Implementing Border Carbon Adjustments: Lessons, 
Cautions, and Research Needs from the Literature, 13 REV. ENVTL ECON. & POL’Y 3 (2019). 
52 See Walden Bello, The Threat of Green Protectionism, 1 BRIDGES 2 (July 1, 1997); see also Peter Holmes et al., 
Border Carbon Adjustments and the Potential for Protectionism, 11 CLIMATE POL’Y 883 (2011). 
53 See also infra Part V.A. 
54 Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 6 (2009). 
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domestic importers or foreign exporters of a covered good to buy emission allowances side by side 
with the domestic producers of the same (or similar) good.55 
While these are the most commonly discussed mechanisms, BCAs can also be 
implemented through the extension of other compliance obligations to imports, such as 
performance standards.  Because border adjustments limited to imports will only affect the relative 
price of domestic and foreign goods in the imposing country,56 a BCA can alternatively or 
cumulatively apply to exports, rebating the domestic carbon constraint through tax or regulatory 
relief.57 
BCAs will generally share a number of common design features.  A BCA has to determine 
its scope and coverage, that is, specify the products and trade flows affected by it, the sectors or 
geographies it applies to, and the types of carbon constraints it adjusts for.  Because BCAs adjust 
for differences in embedded carbon and applicable carbon constraints, they also have to specify 
the scope of included emissions and a methodology to calculate those emissions.  Once embedded 
emissions have been determined, the level of adjustment needs to be determined, factoring in any 
exemptions and rebates afforded to domestic producers.  Finally, decisions also need to be taken 
with regard to the use of collected revenues, and the potential timeline of a BCA, including its 
entry into force and expiration.  As important as the substantive design is the process through 
which the BCA is adopted and implemented, which should be transparent, inclusive, and aim for 
fair and equitable treatment of affected producers. Such design principles are revisited and detailed 
further in the final section of this article.58 
Slight variations to this basic design formula exist, such as BCAs implemented at sub-
national rather than national borders, an approach that has seen application in California.59  Caution 
should be applied, however, to distinguish BCAs from other climate policy measures that are 
conceptually similar and applied at or beyond national borders.  An example is the extension of 
domestic climate policies to activities beyond the sovereign territory of the implementing state, as 
occurred with the inclusion of international air travel in the scope of the EU Emissions Trading 
System.60  Although of interest for the judicial determination it elicited, pursuant to which 
coverage of emissions from foreign aircraft in international airspace and over foreign territory does 
“not infringe the principle of territoriality or the sovereignty” of third states,61 the application of 
the EU Emissions Trading System to international aviation is not a conventional BCA.  Rather 
than adjusting for differences in climate ambition between two jurisdictions, it subjected all 
emissions from air travel—both within and outside the EU’s territory—to the European carbon 
constraint, and merely set out a process to “consider options available in order to provide for 
optimal interaction” with measures in the country of origin, which “may” result in a legislative 
amendment to exclude such flights.62 
                                                 
55 Aaron Cosbey, Border Carbon Adjustment, in TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE 19, 20 (Aaron 
Cosbey ed., 2008). 
56 Carolyn Fischer & Alan K. Fox, Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Carbon Adjustments 
versus Rebates, 64 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 199, 214 (2012). 
57 Kortum & Weisbach, The Design of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices, supra note 12, at 422. 
58 See infra Part VI. 
59 See infra Part IV.B. 
60 See e.g. Jacques Hartmann, A Battle for the Skies: Applying the European Emissions Trading System to International 
Aviation, 82 NORD. J. INT’L L. 187 (2013) 
61 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Ass'n of Am. & Others v. Sec'y of State for Energy and Climate Change ¶ 125 (2011). 
62 See Directive 2008/101, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 Amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading 
within the Community, 2008 O.J. (L 8) 3, art. 25a. 
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Policies to measure and address emissions from consumption similarly share certain 
features with a BCA.  In an attempt to overcome shortfalls of the territorial approach to emissions 
accounting and mitigation, such as emissions displacement from structural change and relocation 
of emitting activities, these policies target emissions along the entire value chain instead of merely 
at the point of production.63  Policies targeting consumption can restore muted policy signals along 
the value chain, complementing policies that operate further upstream.64  Legislation adopted in 
California in October 2017 to ensure that only primary goods meeting California’s strict emission 
standards are eligible for public procurement—the “Buy Clean California Act”65—is an example 
of a policy targeting consumption.  Like BCAs, such approaches require reliable emission data 
and robust methods to track emissions embodied in trade and consumption.66  In contrast to a BCA, 
however, they can intervene at any level between producers, intermediaries, and final consumers, 
and are not limited to deployment at the border.  Moreover, their purpose is to reduce emissions 
from domestic consumption, not to offset differences in climate policy ambition across 
jurisdictions.  On the contrary, inclusion of consumption still leaves room for application of a BCA 
to adjust for policy differentials.67 
A third approach conceptually similar to BCAs is a uniform tariff or customs duty deployed 
by a group of countries committed to an agreed level of climate policy ambition against all products 
imported from trading partners outside the group, irrespective of the embedded carbon content of 
those products.68  This approach is based on the economic theory of “clubs,”69 meaning voluntary 
groups deriving mutual benefits from sharing the costs of activities that have public-good 
characteristics (such as climate change mitigation).  Imposed against countries which fail to join 
the club and meet its climate policy requirements, this approach, its proponents contend, would 
penalize free-riding in an effort to protect the global climate, and promote the emergence of 
coalitions sharing climate ambition with a high level of participation and stability.  Even moderate 
sanctions, they argue, are sufficient to create a strategic situation in which countries acting in their 
self-interest will choose to enter the club and undertake emissions reductions because of the 
structure of the incentives.70  Although this approach therefore shares a strategic objective of 
BCAs, its focus lies on overcoming barriers to climate cooperation rather than adjusting for 
differences in climate ambition.  Accordingly, it also departs in the methods of tariff determination 
and application, limiting the degree of overlap.  Also, as mentioned in the previous sections, BCAs 
are not intended to serve as sanctions, nor do they deploy related terminology. 
 
                                                 
63 See generally van de Lindt et al., Carbon Emission Mitigation by Consumption-Based Accounting and Policy, supra 
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C. Theoretical Analysis and Comparison of Policy Options 
As discussed earlier in this part, the main justification of BCAs is the causation of emissions 
leakage by uneven carbon constraints.  Theoretical analyses suggest that leakage under unilateral 
climate action can be serious enough to outweigh the benefits of such action.71  Ex ante simulations 
using computable general equilibrium and partial equilibrium models suggest the possibility of 
statistically significant impacts, with leakage rates—defined as foreign emissions increases in 
relation to domestic emission reductions—estimated in the range of 5 to 30 percent.72  Sectors with 
high energy intensity that are exposed to international trade, such as cement, steel, and aluminum, 
could see considerably higher leakage rates,73 with some studies estimating up to 90 percent.74   
Empirical ex post analyses have confirmed the existence of leakage, although typically at 
lower rates.75 In part, the modest leakage observed to date is owed to the low ambition of current 
climate policies, and the fact that sectors considered vulnerable to leakage have generally been 
protected through various safeguards.76  As countries heterogeneously increase the ambition of 
their domestic climate policies in line with the decarbonization objectives of the Paris Agreement, 
however, however, leakage may rapidly emerge as a more serious problem. In such a scenario, 
pressure to address emissions leakage, especially in sectors with high energy intensity and trade 
exposure, would continue and even grow as carbon constraints in some countries become more 
stringent, or become stringent more quickly, than in others.77   
Safeguards against emissions leakage have, to date, been largely taken behind the border 
in the form of full or partial exemptions, rebates, and other forms of preferential treatment under 
domestic climate policies.  In the EU Emissions Trading System, for instance, the approach chosen 
to prevent leakage is free allocation of emissions allowances, which has been largely successful at 
avoiding serious leakage.78  In theory, free allocation should only affect the distribution of effort 
and not the overall environmental outcome, measured in terms of overall emissions.  In practice, 
however, it has revealed a number of unintended effects under the EU Emissions Trading System, 
such as muted policy signals along the value chain, windfall profits from cost pass-through, 
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perverse incentives to increase production, and downward pressure on allowance prices.79  Another 
approach to protecting vulnerable sectors, full or partial exemptions from carbon constraints, by 
definition limits the mitigation outcome achieved with those constraints.  Where auctioning, 
pricing, or other forms of payments are affected, exemptions and free allocation also weaken 
revenue streams, which can indirectly undermine investment in mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
Despite their observed shortfalls, however, such safeguards have become deeply 
entrenched, a dynamic reflected, for instance, in the recent negotiations on the extension of the EU 
and the California emissions trading systems.  Although often designed to be temporary, these 
measures have proven resilient to change, and—absent more effective alternatives—would likely 
remain in place given the current context of persistent policy heterogeneity and rising protectionist 
pressures.   
As parties to the Paris Agreement engage in progressively more ambitious climate action, 
the undesirable effects of these approaches will become increasingly untenable, adding to the 
urgency of identifying alternative responses to leakage.  BCAs offer such an alternative with their 
promise to reduce carbon leakage without muting market signals or generating windfall profits.  
Much analysis has gone into assessing the effects of BCAs, with relevant studies generally 
acknowledging the ability of BCAs to alleviate or prevent leakage, although the extent of such 
benefits is difficult to predict and depends on the assessment method. 
A recent survey of economic literature,80 for instance, found that BCAs could reduce the 
leakage ratio by an average of 6 percent relative to a policy scenario without border adjustments.  
Ex ante modelling studies provide a range of estimates, depending on the assumptions used for 
factors such as price elasticity of demand, elasticity of trade substitution, returns to scale, and the 
technological response of individual industries.  Likewise, another study comparing different 
modelling approaches concluded that BCAs can be effective in reducing leakage, on average 
reducing production losses from energy intensive and trade exposed sectors from 2.8 to 1 percent.81  
It bears mentioning, however, that other studies have also suggested more modest effects82 and 
aggregate welfare losses.83  Assessing the merits of BCAs relative to other policies to counteract 
leakage, research has found that BCAs can be significantly more effective than tax exemptions 
and output-based rebates because they preserve price incentives for consumers,84 although there, 
too, outcomes depend on relative emissions rates, elasticities of substitution, and consumption 
volumes.85 
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Aside from confirming the general effectiveness and relative benefits of BCAs, economic 
research yields a number of important insights for BCA design.  Past work has identified indirect 
leakage caused by reduced fossil fuel demand and ensuing pressure on fuel prices as the most 
significant leakage channel, accounting for between one half and two thirds of total effects.86  In 
global energy markets, the pressure exercised on fossil fuel prices in those regions that have 
introduced carbon constraints will stimulate demand elsewhere for the same fuels, shifting 
emissions across regions and weakening the aggregate mitigation effect of domestic climate action.  
Such indirect leakage is particularly difficult to address by way of policies, and largely eludes 
measures taken behind the border.  This favors use of BCAs, which can include energy inputs in 
their scope by incorporating indirect emissions.87  While that may not prevent displacement of fuel 
consumption into unrelated sectors, such as transport and residential heating, it can prevent falling 
input costs—and thus a de facto subsidy—for foreign producers benefitting from weaker or no 
carbon constraints.  
Indirect leakage through falling fuel prices also has other implications for the design of 
BCAs.  For instance, it favors application of a BCA to sectors with comparable production methods 
across jurisdictions, where the share of emissions from production outweighs the share of 
emissions from energy inputs.88  One study moreover suggests that BCAs will be most effective 
when applied in a setting where a limited number of countries has implemented ambitious carbon 
constraints.  In such a situation, declines in world fossil fuel prices will remain secondary to 
leakage through production displacement.  As the group of acting countries grows, the need for 
and effectiveness of BCAs will eventually decline as BCAs address a diminishing leakage rate.89   
Moreover, it bears recalling that BCAs pursue a dual purpose, with the political leveraging 
effect an important objective alongside that of levelling uneven climate policy efforts.90  An 
expanding coalition of countries with BCAs will exert greater political pressure against laggard 
countries to adopt their own carbon constraints,91 which, in turn, can counteract both direct leakage 
through production and investment relocation, as well as indirect leakage through fossil fuel 
displacement. 
In terms of scope and coverage, a majority of leakage reduction benefits can already be 
obtained when a BCA is applied to major energy intensive and trade exposed sectors.92  Inclusion 
of only four products, namely cement, aluminum, steel, and electricity, has been suggested as the 
most economically efficient option to reduce leakage in the EU Emissions Trading System,93 as it 
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avoids the administrative cost and trans-shipment risk associated with inclusion of goods with 
more complex supply chains.  Extensive sectoral and gas coverage may be beneficial in theory, 
but can also alter the terms of trade and shift more of the burden of climate action towards 
developing countries,94 which contravenes core principles of the climate and trade regimes.95   
Excluding exports from a BCA can weaken its ability to counteract leakage,96 although 
most of the benefits should even accrue under a system limited to imports.97  And finally, use of 
the revenue levied through a BCA significantly influences the overall effects of the BCA,98 with 
application towards reducing other distortions in the economy preferable from the perspective of 
the implementing country, but not necessarily the most equitable or politically viable option. The 
foregoing considerations variously inform the recommended BCA design proposed later in this 
article.99 
IV. PAST PROPOSALS AND AND LESSONS LEARNED  
As mentioned earlier, BCAs have been repeatedly proposed in the past, although few of these 
efforts advanced far in the regulatory process, and only one progressed far enough to see actual 
implementation.  Still, the rationale, design features, and broader political context of these 
proposals harbor useful lessons for any future attempt to introduce a BCA.  Relevant initiatives 
have been launched over time both in the European Union and the United States, with an early 
wave in Europe prompted by U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, a subsequent wave in the 
U.S. accompanying proposed federal climate legislation, and, more recently, new initiatives on 
both sides of the Atlantic. While the political and legal context has continued to evolve, as outlined 
earlier in this article,100 the most important proposals are summarized in this section to infer such 
lessons for BCA design and implementation. 
A. Europe 
In 2005, the EU launched its Emissions Trading System, based on Directive 2003/87/EC,101 in 
order to pursue its emission reductions commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU Emissions 
Trading System sets an emissions cap for greenhouse gas emissions from energy producers, 
industrial sectors, and some aviation activity.102  All covered emitters receive emissions 
allowances through a predetermined allocation procedure, which can involve free distribution or 
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auctioning.103  While emission allowances were largely allocated for free during the first trading 
phase (2005–2007), auctioning of allowances became the default for the electricity sector, and was 
set to rise from 20 per cent in 2013 to 70 percent in 2020 for industry.104  This marked a significant 
modification of the allocation process, and led to an intense debate about how to address potential 
carbon leakage, including the option of measures at the border.105 
Since 2007, three proposals have been put forward at EU level to address carbon leakage 
using border measures.  None has been so far applied in practice.  A first informal proposal drafted 
by the European Commission for the third trading period (2013–2020) included a new Article 29, 
which set out a “Future Allowance Import Requirement.”106  It would have applied to products 
exposed to risks of carbon leakage or unfair international competition until trade partners would 
commit to “binding and verifiable action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions comparable to the 
action taken by the Community.”107  According to Article 29(2), the calculation of the BCA for 
imports would have taken the equivalent of the goods’ average emissions in the EU, subtracted the 
free allocation for its production, and multiplied that with the weight of imported goods.108  In its 
proposed Article 29(5), the Commission also suggested an export adjustment through allowances, 
for which a 2 percent set-aside would have been created from EU-wide allowances.  Meeting the 
obligation would have been possible with allowances and eligible offset credits issued under the 
Kyoto Protocol.109 
In the end, however, the option was not included in the published proposal for the third 
phase,110 let alone in Directive 2009/29/EC itself.111  Instead, Article 10b of the Directive mandates 
that the Commission assess carbon leakage risks “in the light of the outcome of the international 
negotiations and the extent to which these lead to global greenhouse gas emission reductions,” to 
be accompanied by “appropriate proposals.”112  Options for policy action listed in Article 10b 
include (1) free allocation, (2) inclusion of importers in the EU ETS, and (3) specific measures for 
leakage from the electricity sector.113  With the second option, the revised directive thus establishes 
a tentative legal basis for a BCA. Paragraph 25 of its preamble further specifies: 
Energy-intensive industries which are determined to be exposed to a significant 
risk of carbon leakage could receive a higher amount of free allocation or an 
effective carbon equalisation system could be introduced with a view to putting 
installations from the Community which are at significant risk of carbon leakage 
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and those from third countries on a comparable footing. Such a system could 
apply requirements to importers that would be no less favourable than those 
applicable to installations within the Community, for example by requiring the 
surrender of allowances. Any action taken would need to be in conformity with 
the principles of the UNFCCC, in particular the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, taking into account the 
particular situation of least developed countries (LDCs). It would also need to 
be in conformity with the international obligations of the Community, including 
the obligations under the WTO agreement.114 
In 2009, a French “non-paper” elaborated on how this mandate could be exercised to include 
importers in the EU Emissions Trading System pursuant to Article 10b(1)(b) of the 2009 
Directive.115  The non-paper set out a BCA for imports, designating it a “Carbon Inclusion 
Mechanism.”  Export adjustments were regarded as a subject requiring further analysis.  Both 
adjustments were to apply only to sectors at carbon leakage risk using the methodology of Article 
10a(15)-(17) of the Directive.116  The non-paper made several references to the need for WTO 
compatibility of the mechanism.117 
Specifically, it recommended two options to trigger the obligation to purchase allowances 
for imports, one focused on countries, the other on sectors.  The first option proposed to cover 
countries that failed to cooperate in a future international climate agreement deemed sufficiently 
ambitious by the EU.  The second option would have instead targeted goods from countries without 
a comparable approach to pricing emissions from relevant sectors.  Under both options, Least 
Developed Countries were explicitly excluded.118 
For the calculation of the BCA, the mechanism would have included only direct emissions 
from production.119  It would have been based on the average carbon content of the same goods 
produced in the EU, minus the free allocation of allowances based on product benchmarks, and 
multiplied by the quantity of goods imported.120  At the time, however, very divisive negotiations 
about the future climate regime contributed to the decision to abandon the proposal in the political 
process.121 
A third attempt at designing a BCA based on Article 10b(1)(b) of the Directive was 
circulated in another French non-paper in February 2016.122   It set out a BCA for the EU Emissions 
Trading System that would apply to imported products meeting three criteria: (1) a high carbon 
intensity and a significant share of total greenhouse gas emissions in Europe; (2) an easy 
determination of the carbon content; and (3) a limited impact on the downstream sector.123  The 
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introduction would be gradual, for example in sectors with a low trade impact.  It also suggested a 
simplified implementation process, which would require an amendment to the Directive 
2009/29/EC.124 
A suggested test sector was the cement industry.  The non-paper states that the cause of 
leakage in this sector, namely imports of cheaper clinker or cement into the EU, could be addressed 
more directly by a BCA.125  Further, the proposal illustrates how implementation might work, from 
using the existing Single Administrative Document of EU customs services, to calculating the 
volume of allowances needed for imports and synchronizing the surrendering of allowances.  This 
would end with the potential magnitude of import volumes (around 1 percent of EU trade) and a 
visualization of the process.126 
While the European Parliament was deliberating amendments to the EU Emissions Trading 
System for the fourth phase (2021–2030) in December 2016, the Committee on Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety took up the proposal and included it in the overall reform package 
for the system.127  The package was subject to a plenary vote in February 2017, however, at which 
point the European Parliament rejected the proposal.128 Legal uncertainty and risk of 
discrimination in downstream and export markets had contributed to opposition against a BCA, 
with the final outcome retaining free allowance allocation to the cement sector instead.129 
B. United States 
In the United States, calls for some form of BCA originated from profound concerns about the 
impacts of climate action on the domestic economy, notably manufacturing, if other parts of the 
world were not to adopt similar efforts.  The Senate passed an unanimous resolution in 1997 
declaring that the United States should not join any climate agreement that would “result in serious 
harm to the U.S. economy” or impose limits on greenhouse gas emissions unless it mandates 
similar limits for developing countries.130  Citing similar concerns, the administration of President 
George W. Bush never submitted the Kyoto Protocol for ratification, and President Donald Trump 
likewise invoked potential harm to the U.S. economy, including job losses and declining industrial 
output, when he announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.131 
1. National Level: Proposals for Federal Legislation 
In 2008–2009, at the end of the Bush administration, BCAs came to the forefront of the U.S. debate 
on climate policy following changes in the 2006 midterm elections.  BCAs were first proposed in 
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2007 by the company American Electric Power, supported by one of the largest labor unions, the 
International Brotherhood of Electric Workers.  Both sought to craft a proposal that would be 
compatible with WTO rules and, ideally, would “never take effect,”132 as it would induce other 
countries to take stronger action in climate change mitigation.  A variety of climate bills in the 
Congress subsequently included provisions that required importers to surrender allowances, in 
anticipation of the loss of competitiveness and American jobs—especially to China.133  None of 
them made it through the legislative process, with the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
sponsored by Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Edward J. Markey coming closest. 
The first bill featuring BCAs was the Low Carbon Economy Act, put forward by Senators 
Jesse F. Bingaman and Arlen Specter in 2007.134  The next bill, the 2008 Climate Security Act, 
suggested the establishment of an International Reserve Allowance Program,135 which would 
require U.S. importers of covered goods from covered countries to purchase international reserve 
allowances from a separate pool of allowances.  The American Clean Energy and Security Act, 
passed by the House of Representatives in 2009, also included a provision on border adjustment 
measures.136 
A comparison of the proposals yields several insights.  First, the proposed coverage of 
goods slowly expanded.  Initially, various bills applied to energy-intensive primary goods (e.g., 
cement, iron and steel, aluminum), which are used in the manufacturing of other products.  Then, 
under various bills submitted after the 2008 version of the Climate Security Act, it became possible 
to apply the requirement to consumer goods.  The international reserve allowance program in the 
2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act covered goods from “eligible industrial sectors.”  
In addition, the bill also applied to manufactured items for consumption. 
In terms of country coverage, early bills suggested applying the BCA only to countries that 
had not taken “comparable action” or that were not exempted because of low development or low 
emissions.  The final version of the 2008 Climate Security Act included a more stringent 
“comparable action” test, effectively requiring any foreign country to adopt the same kind of 
greenhouse gas emission caps as the United States.  However, this stringency was moderated by a 
provision for those countries that did not reduce or limit their emissions to the same extent, but 
still had policies and/or legislation in place to limit greenhouse gases.  The clause covered a broad 
range of activities, but did not indicate what level of climate effort would be considered sufficient.  
It was also unclear how policies with quantified emission reduction objectives would be compared 
to other policies of a more qualitative nature, such as voluntary agreements or subsidies for 
renewable energy.  Similarly, it was unclear how the program would deal with policies aimed at 
long-term emission reductions.137 
Another difference in the bills concerned the authority to decide whether other countries 
were taking comparable action, which was initially delegated to the President.  Some of the later 
bills authorized a new body—the International Climate Change Commission—to make this 
evaluation. 
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The 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act, as passed by the House, did not 
include a definition of “comparable action,” but followed the basic logic of other bills by 
exempting countries with low emissions, a low level of development, or that met certain standards 
specified in the bill’s definition of “comparable action.”  These would have required third countries 
to: have economy-wide emission caps in place; enter into a sectoral bilateral or multilateral 
agreement with the United States; or have a lower sectoral energy or greenhouse gas intensity than 
the United States. 
Concerning the calculation of the BCA, in most bills the basis for defining the number of 
reserve allowances required for imports consisted of a formula considering: (1) the national 
greenhouse gas intensity rate in a covered country for a category of covered goods; (2) an 
adjustment factor for the allowances that were allocated free of charge in the United States; and 
(3) an economic adjustment ratio for foreign countries.   
Finally, the bills differed with regard to the date of entry into effect of the measure.  While 
the Low Carbon Economy Act targeted 2020, the implementation date was gradually moved up in 
subsequent bills.  The American Clean Energy and Security Act version passed by the House 
moved this date to 2020 again.  The President had much less discretion over BCA applications, 
and could only decide against implementing the measure together with Congress.  The gap between 
enactment and the start of the program would have allowed time for potentially affected countries 
to develop and implement domestic climate change mitigation policies, and also for international 
climate change negotiations to deliver results.138 
After the American Clean Energy and Security Act failed to reach a vote in the Senate, 
legislative activity on climate change lost much of its political momentum.  While several further 
bills addressing specific aspects of climate change were proposed in the following years, few had 
the scope – and none the political support – of the bills introduced in the 110th and 111th Congress.  
Accordingly, the need to counteract leakage and safeguard competitiveness was seen as less 
urgent, and corresponding proposals are therefore fewer and less elaborate.  Several such bills 
focused on a specific climate policy instrument: a carbon tax or fee.  In July 2018, for instance, 
Representative Carlos Curbelo introduced a bill to introduce a federal carbon tax coupled with a 
BCA for imports and exports.139 
If adopted, it would have eliminated the federal excise tax on gasoline and diesel fuel in 
favor of a carbon tax levied on fossil fuels and certain industrial facilities and products, with 
revenue earmarked to fund infrastructure projects, such as modernization of the highway network.  
At the same time, it would have curtailed executive powers to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
from stationary sources and would have authorized the Department of the Treasury to introduce a 
BCA. Importers of goods with high trade and carbon intensity would have been liable to a tax 
equivalent to the domestic carbon tax, while exporters of such goods would have received 
commensurate rebates.140 
While the BCA in this bill would have echoed several elements of the earlier proposals 
before the 110th and 111th Congress, such as the exemption of Least Developed Countries and the 
inclusion of a de minimis clause, it would not have accounted for the level of climate ambition in 
affected countries.  Instead, it placed particular emphasis on process—including early 
notification—and its environmental objectives, described in the bill as promotion of “a strong 
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global effort to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and prevention of carbon 
leakage.141  Although the bill generated some debate because of its Republican sponsor, it never 
was brought to a vote in Committee.  
Given the continued challenge of advancing climate legislation in a divided Congress, 
proposals for a federal BCA have also been fielded by civil society.  On February 8th, 2017, the 
Climate Leadership Council—a think tank dedicated to promoting a carbon tax—released a policy 
proposal that included a BCA.  Titled The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends, it called for 
the introduction of a gradually increasing carbon tax applied upstream to fossil fuels, dividing the 
tax proceeds equally, and returning them to the public as a “carbon dividend” in the form of direct 
payments.  Under the proposal, this tax would be accompanied by the establishment of BCAs for 
the carbon content of both imports and exports.  Existing climate regulations would also be 
eliminated, as they would be rendered unnecessary by the carbon tax.142 
For its authors, the plan offered a single solution to multiple problems: the border 
adjustment would address free riding and compel other countries to follow suit; and the progressive 
nature of its dividends would help reduce inequality and redirect populist energy with political 
victories across the aisle that could help bridge divisions.143  Exports from “sectors with greater 
than 5% energy cost in final value should have any carbon taxes rebated,” and “non-emissive fossil 
fuel products” should be exempt, with a refund for any tax previously paid.144  An analysis of 
carbon price levels required to achieve meaningful mitigation, however, did not assume significant 
impacts in terms of emissions from the BCA, based on an assumption “that the border adjustments 
broadly cancel each other out in terms of emissions.”145 
BCAs could see a resurgence in the wake of discussions on a “Green New Deal”, which 
couples environmental concerns with calls for social justice and more equal distribution of wealth.  
A resolution introduced early in the 116th Congress by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, 
for instance, calls for “enacting and enforcing trade rules, procurement standards, and border 
adjustments with strong labor and environmental protections … to stop the transfer of jobs and 
pollution overseas.”146  While a corresponding resolution introduced by Senator Edward J. Markey 
failed too pass a vote in the Senate, the “Green New Deal” discussion illustrates how populist calls 
for economic retrenchment and the perceived need for stronger action on climate change combine 
to generate political support for BCAs, as argued earlier in this article.147 
2. Subnational Level: California 
At the subnational level, California—the second largest greenhouse gas emitter among U.S. 
states148—has also explored the use of a BCA as part of its climate policy framework.  Based on a 
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mandate set out in the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,149 the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) launched a comprehensive emissions trading system in 2013.150  California was 
concerned about the economic and environmental implications of this measure, and therefore 
included a statutory mandate to minimize emissions leakage.151  In addition to free allocation for 
industrial facilities, CARB Resolution 10-42 directed its staff to review the technical and legal 
issues related to a BCA for the cement sector,152 which resulted in the identification of three 
specific options.  Although these have not been adopted to date,153 their discussion allowed 
weighing the benefits and drawbacks of each option, such as administrative complexity, flexibility, 
and consistency. 
In the electricity sector, by contrast, California has to account for emissions associated with 
imported power.  Accordingly, electricity importers—the “first deliverers” of imported 
electricity—are liable for the emissions associated with electricity generated in sources outside 
California, provided that state does not have an emissions trading system linked to California’s 
one.154  Additionally, the rules declare all emissions reported for imported electricity from 
unspecified sources to be above the coverage threshold, and apply a default emissions factor 
multiplied by a transmission loss correction factor.155  Because California forms part of a 
physically interconnected electricity system—the Western Interconnection—and imports around 
one third of its power from neighboring states, these provisions have significant relevance in 
practice. 
A specific challenge California had to face is “resource shuffling,” occurring where entities 
lower their compliance obligation by substituting electricity with a lower carbon intensity for 
electricity with higher carbon intensity, swapping the related contract or ownership arrangement, 
and selling the electricity with higher carbon intensity in states without the emission constraints 
imposed in California.156  Not only is this a particular form of leakage in the electricity sector that 
undercuts emissions reductions in California, but it also allows electricity importers to avoid 
compliance with BCA provisions.  While difficult to regulate, this practice has been addressed by 
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updating the regulatory framework, which expressly proscribes resource shuffling, and sets out a 
detailed list of permitted (“safe harbor”) practices.157 
In 2017, the California legislature considered options to extend the emissions trading 
framework beyond its current end date of 2020.  A proposal introduced in the State Senate158 would 
have required importers of covered products to surrender allowances “equal to the lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions” associated with the product.  In the end, however, the California 
legislature endorsed a different bill, Assembly Bill 398, which authorizes the continuation of the 
California emissions trading system from 2021 to 2030.159  Adopted with a substantial majority, 
this legislation retains the system of free allocation currently in place, and merely requests CARB 
to submit, by December 31st, 2025, recommendations on necessary changes to reduce leakage, 
including on a potential BCA.160 
V. REQUIREMENTS FOR BCAS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
A. BCAs and International Trade Law 
International trade law is regularly invoked as a reason not to adopt BCAs,161  and much ink has 
been spilled on whether, and under which conditions, BCAs could be compatible with WTO 
law.162  In this section, we analyze the implications of international trade law for BCA design.  We 
first examine whether and under which conditions BCAs can be compatible with the non-
discrimination obligations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),163 and then 
discuss their possible justification under the GATT’s environmental exceptions.  Turning to 
export-oriented BCAs, we also briefly discuss the role of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.164  Our analysis reveals an important and underappreciated point—that 
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the legal validity of any BCA depends on its specific design features and the modalities of its 
application and implementation.   
1. GATT Non-Discrimination Obligations 
The GATT contains two central obligations related to non-discrimination: Article III (“national 
treatment”) and Article I (“most-favored nation treatment”).  Before turning to these provisions, 
however, we first discuss whether BCAs can be captured by the broader concept of border tax 
adjustment (BTA) in GATT Article II:2(a). 
a. Border Tax Adjustment  
A BCA is, in essence, a climate-related variant of a BTA, which is based on the idea that a country 
may impose domestic taxes and charges on imports, and exempt or reimburse them on exports.165  
The underlying aim is to ensure trade neutrality of domestic taxation.  Conceptually, BTAs 
originate in the destination principle of taxation, according to which a product is taxed where it is 
consumed, rather than where it is produced.166  An important resource for understanding BTA 
provisions under the GATT is the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments.167  For 
the purpose of its analysis, the Working Party drew on a definition of BTAs by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).168  The Working Party clarified that the 
main reference points in the GATT for BTAs on imports were Articles II and III. 
GATT Article II provides that imports shall “be exempt from all other duties or charges of 
any kind.”169  If a BCA qualifies as such an import charge, it violates Article II.  According to 
GATT Article II:2(a), however, Parties may impose a charge on an imported product, provided it 
is equivalent to an internal tax the relevant Parties already impose on “like” domestic products or 
on an article from which the imported product has been produced in whole or in part.170  To escape 
the scrutiny of Article II, a BCA thus has to be designed so that its imposition is not triggered by 
the importation act as such, but rather by an “internal factor” (e.g., the internal sale of the 
product).171 
GATT Article III:2 further specifies that imports “shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly 
or indirectly, to like domestic products.”172  The Working Party dwelled upon the phrase “directly 
or indirectly” as enshrined in Article III:2, and concluded that taxes directly levied on products are 
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eligible for a BTA, as are indirect taxes, provided they are levied on products.173  The Working 
Party did not reach a conclusion, however, on whether BTAs are allowed for taxes imposed only 
on inputs physically incorporated in the final product or inputs that are exhausted in the production 
process, including taxes based on the energy consumed in the manufacturing process.  The 
Working Party merely noted that “there was a divergence of views with regard to the eligibility 
for adjustment of certain categories of tax,”174 such as “taxes occultes,” which encompass 
consumption taxes on capital equipment, auxiliary materials and services used in the transportation 
and production of other taxable goods, as well as taxes on advertising, energy, machinery, and 
transport. 
Neither the GATT nor the WTO dispute settlement bodies have had an occasion to resolve 
this issue.  The only relevant precedent is the GATT Panel decision in the U.S.—Superfund case.175 
This involved the United States’ Superfund Act, under which the United States levied taxes on 
imports of certain chemicals and the end-products using those chemicals as inputs.  The Panel 
concluded that taxes on substances used in the composition of the final product could be adjusted 
at the border.  In this particular case, however, it remained unclear whether those substances were 
still physically present in the final product, or whether they had been exhausted in the production 
process, and the Panel made no distinction to that effect.176  Thus, the jury is still out on whether 
a BTA is permissible for taxes imposed on an input not physically incorporated in the final product, 
as would be the case with a BTA for energy inputs.177  It would ultimately depend on how broadly 
any future WTO dispute settlement body interprets the terms of Article II:2(a) and Article III:2 of 
the GATT.178 
The situation is even less settled for BCAs linked to emissions trading systems, as these 
raise the additional question of whether the requirement to purchase emission allowances 
constitutes an adjustable tax or charge covered by Article III:2, or an internal regulation under 
Article III:4.  Because it is compulsory and unrequited, the duty to purchase and surrender 
allowances can arguably be viewed as an adjustable internal tax.179  This argument is most 
convincing if emission allowances are auctioned, but even if they are handed out for free they 
create an opportunity cost for those who receive them.180  Nonetheless, it remains distinctly 
possible that a WTO dispute settlement body would find that the inclusion of importers in an 
emissions trading system falls under Article III:4. 
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In short, it remains unclear what the legal status of BCAs would be under the GATT and, 
accordingly, which requirements a measure would need to meet. BCAs could qualify as a “border 
tax adjustment” under Article II:2(a) if a WTO dispute settlement body rules that an adjustment is 
possible on the basis of energy consumed in the production process. But even if this were the case, 
questions remain for BCAs related to emissions trading systems, which could either be deemed a 
tax or charge under Article III:2 or an internal regulation under Article III:4. 
b. National Treatment  
Assuming the BCA is considered a BTA under GATT Article II:2(a), meaning it can be considered 
an adjustable tax, it would still need to abide by the national treatment requirements of Article III:2 
of the GATT, which are aimed at ensuring that imported products are not discriminated vis-à-vis 
“like” domestic products.  This essentially requires the following two conditions to be satisfied: 
(1) imports are not charged, either directly or indirectly, “in excess of” those applied on “like” 
domestic products; and (2) internal taxes or other internal charges are not applied to imported or 
domestic products in a manner that affords “protection to domestic production.”181 
The first condition draws attention to the notion of “like products,” a central issue for the 
determination of WTO compatibility of BCAs.182  By way of example: can aluminum produced 
using electricity generated from coal be treated “like” aluminum produced using electricity from 
natural gas or renewable energy, even if the carbon footprint of the former is much higher than 
that of the latter?  As per GATT/WTO jurisprudence, the following criteria may be taken into 
account when determining “like” products, on a case-by-case basis:183 
 the products’ properties, nature, and quality, i.e. the physical features of the products;184 
 the products’ end-uses in a given market, i.e. the extent to which they are capable of serving 
the same or similar end-uses;185 
 consumers’ tastes and habits, i.e. the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the 
products as alternative means of performing the same function(s) in order to satisfy a 
particular want or demand;186 and 
 the international classification of the products for tariff purposes187 (e.g., the Harmonized 
System Codes commodity classification). 
Any determination of “like” products should ideally take into account all the criteria, even if they 
provide “conflicting indications.”188  Moreover, the list of criteria should not be considered 
exhaustive, as other elements could be taken into account by a WTO dispute settlement body when 
deciding on the likeness of products.189  Furthermore, any WTO dispute settlement body is likely 
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to have some discretion in determining the likeness of products.190  While some have argued that 
low-carbon and carbon-intensive products can be presumed to not be “like” products,191 ultimately, 
any decision will depend on the specific circumstances of each case,192 as well as on how the panel 
examining the case exercises its discretion in assessing the facts and the relevant law. 
That said, a few points can be made regarding how a BCA would fare in light of these 
criteria.  With regard to the first two criteria (a product’s physical features and its end-uses), it 
should be clear that there is no legally relevant difference, for instance, between imported steel 
produced with fossil fuels and domestic steel produced using renewable energy .  Likewise, tariff 
classifications are unlikely to distinguish between different cement-based products based on the 
way they are produced.193  With regard to consumers’ tastes and habits, the WTO Appellate Body 
seemed to widen the scope in the EC—Asbestos case by suggesting that these “are very likely to 
be shaped by the health risks associated with a product.”194  Given the health risks posed by climate 
change, it may be argued that consumers will distinguish between low-carbon and carbon-intensive 
products.  However, the health effects of carbon-intensive products are more indirect than the 
effects of carcinogenic asbestos and unrelated to the product as such.  In short, unless it can be 
demonstrated that consumers treat products with high and low carbon intensities differently (or are 
likely to do so), or other criteria assume a greater role in future jurisprudence, low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive products will probably be considered “like products.” 
A finding of likeness, however, need not lead to a violation of the national treatment 
obligation. The next question that arises here is whether a BCA can be designed so that it does not 
end up taxing imports “in excess of” domestic products.  Any “excess,” however small, may 
already be considered a violation of GATT Article III.195  To avoid such a determination, it may 
be safer to base the BCA on the lowest charges incurred by domestic producers.196 
Although low-carbon and carbon-intensive products can be found to be “like”, they can 
also be considered “directly competitive or substitutable products” under the second condition in 
GATT Article III:2197—a broader notion than that of “like products.”198  Factors that need to be 
taken into consideration in deciding whether two products are “directly competitive or 
substitutable” include: the nature of the products compared; the nature of competitive conditions 
in the relevant market; physical characteristics of the products compared; common end-use; and 
tariff classifications.199  The Appellate Body opened the possibility that products with different 
carbon intensities could fall under this category, finding that “[w]hat constitutes a competitive 
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relationship between products may require consideration of inputs and processes of production 
used to produce the product.”200 
GATT Ad Article III, paragraph 2 specifies that a tax can only be deemed inconsistent with 
the second sentence “in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed 
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not 
similarly taxed.”201  To prove that two products are “not similarly taxed,” it needs to be shown that 
the tax burden on the imported product is heavier than on “directly competitive or substitutable” 
domestic products, and that the tax burden goes beyond a de minimis burden in any given case.202  
This is a more lenient requirement than the “not in excess of” requirement under the first 
condition.203  Furthermore, even if products are “directly competitive or substitutable” and “not 
similarly taxed,” it needs to be found that the measure was not “applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”204  This can be shown by tax 
differentials,205 but the intent of a policy may also play a role.206  The requirements for a BCA 
under Article III:2, second sentence, are therefore more lenient than those under the first sentence.  
Finally, as noted above, it may be that a BCA would be considered an internal regulation 
falling under Article III:4.  This provision also raises the issue of “like products.”207  For Article 
III:4, the main question is whether “the products involved are—or could be—in a competitive 
relationship in the marketplace.”208  Following the discussion of “like products” above, domestic 
low-carbon aluminum and imported carbon-intensive aluminum would probably be considered 
“like.”  As a consequence, imports “shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin.”209  With regard to “no less favourable” treatment, the 
Panel in U.S.—Clove Cigarettes found that it must be shown that any “adverse effects are related 
to the foreign origin of the product at issue” and that a Panel should “consider whether the 
detrimental effect(s) can be explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin 
of the product.”210  This suggests that, under Article III:4, as long as the BCA is linked to a 
product’s carbon footprint rather than its origin—i.e., the different treatment can be explained by 
environmental considerations, and the measure is origin-neutral—the measure would be 
permissible. 
Avoiding a violation of the national treatment requirement would thus most likely succeed 
if a BCA were considered to be an internal regulation under GATT Article III:4, and if the BCA 
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design clearly displays its environmental intent.  However, there is also a possibility that a BCA 
would be deemed permissible under the regime of Article III:2, second sentence. 
c. Most-Favored Nation Treatment  
Another core non-discrimination obligation under the GATT is contained in Article I:1, which sets 
out the principle of most-favored nation treatment by demanding that “any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined 
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”211 
If BCAs are applied to “like” products based on their country of origin, favoring products 
from countries with stringent climate policies and penalizing products from countries with weak 
or no climate policies, they are likely to violate this principle.212  Conversely, if the BCA applies 
uniformly to all imports, regardless of country of origin and country-specific features, it should 
meet the most-favoured nation requirement.  However, in such a scenario, the BCA could be 
challenged by countries that have effective emission reduction measures in place, as their exports 
would end up being subject to a carbon constraint twice: once while complying with their domestic 
climate policies; and again upon entry into the country implementing the BCA.213  Exporters from 
countries without strong emission reduction policies would thus have an advantage not accorded 
to exporters with strong climate policies. 
Another question arises with regard to BCAs that are based on the carbon footprint of a 
product.  In Indonesia—Autos, the panel determined that MFN treatment “cannot be made 
conditional on any criteria that are not related to the imported product itself.”214  This suggests that 
distinguishing between countries based on non-product-related processes and production methods 
would be inadmissible.  However, a subsequent panel in Canada—Autos arguably opened the door 
for genuinely origin-neutral measures that are based on such processes and production methods, 
including BCAs based on a product’s embedded carbon.215 
Finally, a separate question is whether derogation from the most-favored nation 
requirement is possible for developing countries, particularly Least Developed Countries.  
According to the 1979 Enabling Clause, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the 
General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to 
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developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties.”216  In another 
provision, the Enabling Clause further instructs countries to take particular account of Least 
Developed Countries “in view of their special economic situation and their development, financial 
and trade needs.”217  The Enabling Clause thus offers an exception to the most-favored nation 
requirement of GATT Article I, and draws attention to the situation of Least Developed Countries. 
Still, this exception may not result in a measure that “raise[s] barriers to or create[s] undue 
difficulties for the trade” of other countries.218  This means, for instance, that exempting Least 
Developed Countries from a BCA cannot result in other countries facing increased barriers to 
trade.  Furthermore, a measure must “respond positively to the development, financial and trade 
needs of developing countries.”219  According to the AB in EC—Tariff Preferences, a sufficient 
nexus should exist between, on the one hand, the preferential treatment provided and, on the other 
hand, the likelihood of alleviating the relevant “development, financial [or] trade need.”220  In the 
context of BCAs, this means that the preferential treatment must have clear benefits for the 
countries receiving the treatment.  One way of achieving this would be to earmark part of the 
revenues from BCAs to support developing countries, and in particular Least Developed 
Countries. 
While the most-favored nation requirement thus generally instructs the BCA-implementing 
country to treat other countries alike, some exceptions may be possible for specific groups of 
countries.  As discussed in Part V.B.1.c below, this may matter in the context of a possible 
justification under the chapeau of GATT Article XX. 
2. GATT Environmental Exceptions 
As outlined in the preceding sections, a BCA can be designed in such a way that it reduces the 
likelihood of violating free trade disciplines under GATT Articles I and III.  Still, considerable 
legal uncertainty remains, owed in part to the lack of conclusive case law on border adjustments.  
For countries considering the introduction of a BCA, this brings up the potential role of the 
exceptions contained in GATT Article XX. 
Article XX provides a closed list of defenses to uphold GATT-inconsistent measures that are 
taken for legitimate public policy reasons, such as public health, environmental protection, and 
public morals.  Although climate policy is not directly mentioned in these exception clauses, a 
BCA that is found to violate one of the provisions of the GATT may still fall under one of the 
Agreement’s exceptions.  For the purposes of a BCA, the measures outlined in GATT Articles 
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XX(b) and XX(g) are the most relevant.221  Measures that are provisionally justified through these 
exceptions must, however, also satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. Each of 
these elements is set out in greater detail below. 
a. Article XX(b) 
GATT Article XX(b) offers an exception for measures that are “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.”  Given that these important objectives can be put at risk by climate 
change—including through related droughts, floods, and extreme weather events222—a strong case 
can be made that a BCA aimed at preserving a more stable climate is relevant to this provision.  In 
Brazil—Taxation, the Panel put it clearly: “the reduction of CO2 emissions is one of the policies 
covered by subparagraph (b) of Article XX, given that it can fall within the range of policies that 
protect human life or health.”223  By contrast, an economic rationale—e.g., safeguarding the 
competitiveness of energy-intensive industries or levelling the playing field—would not be 
considered a legitimate objective under the exceptions of Article XX(b).224 
Whether a BCA is a necessary measure may prove more difficult to establish.  WTO 
jurisprudence points to at least three factors that require “weighing and balancing” to determine 
the necessity of a measure in accordance with Article XX(b).225 
First, although necessity does not require a measure to be “indispensable or of absolute 
necessity or inevitable,”226 the measure in question should be “apt” to make a “material” 
contribution to the achievement of the provision’s purpose.227  This involves establishing “a 
genuine relationship of ends and means” between the two.228  This means that the BCA should 
contribute to emission reductions, inter alia, by reducing the risk of carbon leakage.229  If a 
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measure is intended to address carbon leakage, but estimates of leakage are low for the affected 
sectors, it may be challenging to demonstrate a material contribution.  Focusing a BCA on the 
most carbon-intensive, leakage-exposed sectors would strengthen the link between the measure 
and its environmental objective.  Importantly, a measure associated with addressing climate 
change may be treated with some latitude.  In Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, the WTO Appellate Body 
recognized that an ends-means relationship may not come to the fore immediately, noting that “the 
results obtained from certain actions—for instance, measures adopted in order to attenuate global 
warming and climate change […] can only be evaluated with the benefit of time.”230 
Second, the measure in question will need to be proportional to the values it seeks to 
protect.  As noted by the Appellate Body in Korea—Beef, “[t]he more vital or important [the] 
common interests or values pursued” by the measure, the easier it would be to pass the necessity 
test.231  The enormous global importance attached to the problem of climate change, as recognized 
by the best available science,232 and the adoption, widespread ratification, and entry into force of 
the Paris Agreement suggest that a BCA would pass this step quite easily. 
Third, establishing necessity also requires “an absence of an alternative measure that 
would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade.”233  This test shifts the burden of 
proof to the complainant, who must prove the reasonable availability of such a less trade-restrictive 
alternative.234  In the case of BCAs, the free allocation of emission allowances to domestic polluters 
may form one such alternative.  However, as noted in Part III.C, the economic and environmental 
performance of free allocation is questionable.  Moreover, the WTO-compatibility of such 
allocation is doubtful.235  More generally, assessment of this step is dependent on the greater policy 
context of the challenged measure, and how different components of a policy interact.236 
b. Article XX(g) 
Where the determination of necessity under Article XX(b) is associated with some uncertainty, a 
more lenient assessment is offered by Article XX(g).  Under this provision, a measure that would 
otherwise violate the GATT may be upheld where it is one “relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources,”237 on the condition that the measure is “made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”238 
Satisfying this provision requires, first, demonstrating that a safe climate is an “exhaustible 
natural resource.”239  Notably, in its consideration of air pollution—an environmental concern with 
strong parallels to climate change—the Panel in U.S.—Gasoline recognized clean air as a resource 
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that is both exhaustible and natural within the meaning of this provision.240  Indeed, taking an 
evolutionary approach to the concept, the Appellate Body in U.S.—Shrimp underscored that this 
term should be interpreted “in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations 
about the protection and conservation of the environment.”241  An indication of the major concern 
attached to climate change by the international community can be provided by international treaties 
such as the Paris Agreement.242  It can furthermore be persuasively argued that climate change 
itself is associated with the depletion of other natural resources such as biodiversity and reliable 
water supplies.243  As such, it is likely that a BCA would pass this first test. 
The second element of this provision implies that any BCA would need to “relate to” the 
conservation of a safe climate.  In this regard, a member should demonstrate that the chosen 
measure is “reasonably related” to the end outlined in Article XX(g).244  Consequently, the 
legislation may not be “disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy 
objective of protection and conservation,”245 or merely “incidentally or inadvertently aimed at” 
this goal.246  This requirement has been easily met in previous cases such as U.S.—Gasoline and 
U.S.—Shrimp, prompting one author to conclude that “[u]nless there are blatant inconsistencies or 
protectionist features in the domestic legislation, climate change legislation [such as BCAs] should 
normally pass this ‘related to’ test.”247 
Turning to the provision’s final qualifier, any measure must be “made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and consumption.”  The WTO jurisprudence 
suggests that this entails a “requirement of even-handedness,” but not “identical treatment of 
domestic and imported products.”248  In the case of BCAs, therefore, while this provision appears 
to require the application of carbon-restrictive measures to both domestic and imported products, 
these products do not need to be treated equally.  Given that any BCA would likely be applied 
together with carbon constraints imposed on domestic producers, it should not be difficult for the 
measure to pass this test.  In fact, even if the relevant legislation were to discriminate against 
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imports in some of its details, compared to domestic products the legislation or the measure as a 
whole could still be found to meet this test.249 
c. Article XX Chapeau 
The preceding analysis suggests that although both defenses are feasible, a BCA would likely stand 
a higher chance of meeting the requirements of Article XX(g) test compared to Article XX(b).  In 
both cases, however, the measure will additionally need to pass the requirements of the chapeau 
of Article XX. This means that the measure may not be applied in a manner that would constitute: 
(1) arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; (2) unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; or (3) a disguised restriction 
on international trade.250  The chapeau is not about the measure as such, but about the provisions 
related to its detailed operation and how it is applied in practice.251 
With regard to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, the Appellate Body in U.S.—
Shrimp has highlighted the importance of “basic fairness and due process” in the application of a 
measure.252  This would require, inter alia, a process that is “transparent” and “predictable”, and 
offers formal opportunities for the exporting countries concerned “to be heard, or to respond to 
any arguments.”253  For instance, if the BCA includes a process to determine whether another 
country has taken comparable action to the country implementing the measure, it would be 
important to involve the affected country in any such determination, and allow opportunities to 
appeal decisions.254  Another way of strengthening the fairness of the BCA would be to allow 
foreign producers to prove that the carbon intensity of their products is lower than a benchmark 
set by the BCA-implementing country.255  Furthermore, allowing a phase-in period to reduce the 
compliance burden of affected countries and afford them time to increase domestic climate policy 
efforts may be appropriate.256 
In addition, the country implementing the BCA must engage in “serious, across-the-board 
negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements” to address 
climate change before imposing the BCA.257  This requires “serious good faith efforts to reach an 
agreement” on the part of the implementing country, but not necessarily the conclusion of an 
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agreement.258  Moreover, such negotiations should not lead to any discrimination,259 meaning that 
any negotiations should involve all affected countries.  Ongoing climate talks in the context of the 
UNFCCC—or even the negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement—arguably meet this criterion.  
However, since these negotiations do not specifically concern the BCA, bilateral negotiations with 
affected countries are likely warranted, also in light of the requirement to ensure basic fairness and 
due process. 
Another requirement, related to whether the measure discriminates against “countries 
where the same conditions prevail,” is that any measure must be applied with “sufficient flexibility 
to take into account the specific conditions prevailing in any exporting Member.”260  Specifically, 
the country implementing the BCA cannot “use an economic embargo to require other Members 
to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal” 
as that of the implementing country, “without taking into consideration different conditions which 
may occur” in other countries.261  However, while a country thus cannot require another country 
to adopt the same regulatory program, it can require the adoption of a program “comparable in 
effectiveness.”262 
To satisfy these conditions, a BCA should take into account, first, whether and how another 
country has implemented climate policies.263  In a world of heterogeneous emission reduction 
policies, taking into account the efforts of other countries raises the vexing question of how 
different policies can be compared in the first place.264  A BCA might, for instance, refer to 
progress made in other countries’ implementation of their respective NDCs, as reported under the 
Paris Agreement.265  Second, in line with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities applied in the international climate regime,266 as well 
as the need for “special and differential treatment” of developing countries recognized under the 
international trade regime,267 a BCA should take into account countries’ levels of economic 
development.268  This would open the door for differential treatment of poorer countries, such as 
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Least Developed Countries.  These considerations suggest that there is a trade-off between 
satisfying the requirements of the chapeau and avoiding a violation of the most-favored nation 
requirement: while favourable treatment of developing countries, and particularly Least Developed 
Countries, may ensure that the BCA avoids arbitrary or unjustified discrimination, it would 
increase the risk of running afoul of the most-favored nation treatment. 
Lastly, in EC—Seals, the AB found that “one of the most important factors in the 
assessment of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination is the question of whether the discrimination 
can be reconciled with, or is rationally related to, the policy objective with respect to which the 
measure has been provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX.”269  This 
means that the BCA must be designed and applied in such a way that it leads to emission 
reductions.  In this regard, including export rebates could undermine the justification of a BCA on 
imports under Article XX GATT, as they could create an incentive for carbon-intensive production 
destined for export.270 
To determine whether a measure constitutes “a disguised restriction on international trade,” 
jurisprudence suggests, first, that a measure has been “publicly announced.”271  Second, the 
determination of “disguised restriction” should also take into account whether the measure also 
amounts to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.272  Finally, “the design, architecture and 
revealing structure”273 of a measure should be taken into account.  As a consequence, if a BCA 
passes the tests posed by the chapeau’s other two tiers (pertaining to arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination), if the measure is publicly announced before its application, and if its “design, 
architecture and revealing structure” do not blatantly indicate protectionist intents, then it is likely 
to pass this hurdle. 
3. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Aside from the GATT, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures contains 
rules that may constrain the design of a BCA.  Specifically, applying a BCA to exports may qualify 
as a “subsidy”—and possibly a prohibited export subsidy—under the Agreement.274 
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According to Article 1, a subsidy is a financial contribution by a government that confers 
a benefit.275  While export-oriented BCAs could qualify as one form of financial contribution—
i.e. government revenue foregone—footnote 1 of the Agreement adds that “the exemption of an 
exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic 
consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have 
accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.”276  The reference to “borne by the like product” 
once again raises the question of whether products with different carbon intensities are “like.”277 
If the BCA is indeed considered a “subsidy,” it may be deemed a prohibited subsidy 
“contingent […] upon export performance.”278  However, item (g) of Annex I of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which contains an Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, 
indicates that exemption or remission of indirect taxes279 for exports “not in excess of those levied 
in respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption” 
is allowed.280  While at first blush, the Agreement thus seems to pose no major hurdle for export-
oriented BCAs, two issues nonetheless arise.  First, ensuring that the remission is “not in excess” 
of taxes accrued may be challenging for BCAs linked to an emissions trading system, where 
fluctuating prices on the carbon market make overcompensation possible if market prices are lower 
than the price originally paid for allowances.281  In such cases, and where the domestic carbon 
constraint takes the form of a regulatory measure rather than a carbon price, the only viable export 
BCA may be a complete exemption of products destined for export, which can be technically 
challenging where the eventual destination of the product is uncertain at the time of production.  
Second, and more importantly, export BCAs could discourage emission reductions in export-
oriented sectors, and thereby undermine the environmental rationale of the measure.282  As noted 
in our discussion of the chapeau of GATT Article XX above, this may have reverberations for the 
justification of the BCA as a whole.283  This means that the legal admissibility of export BCAs 
remains shrouded in considerable uncertainty.284 
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B. BCAs and International Climate Change Law 
Aside from international trade law, it is important to ensure that a BCA complies with the rules 
and principles of the international climate change regime.  Unlike WTO law, however, 
international climate change law offers only limited concrete guidance.  Borrowing language from 
GATT Article XX’s chapeau, the main relevant provision in the UNFCCC states that “[m]easures 
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”285  This 
provision as such, however, “neither condones nor forbids using trade measures,”286 and it cannot 
be assumed that the relevant analysis for Article XX GATT would equally apply to this provision. 
In addition, the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”287 offers broad guidance that ideally should be taken into account in the design and 
application of any measure.288  Although the precise contents of the principle remain contested, 
the principle suggests it is important to take into account the different historical contribution to 
climate change by developing countries, as well as the level of countries’ economic development.  
For a long time, differential treatment in the climate regime was characterized by a bifurcation of 
developed and developing countries.289  While not abandoning this characterization altogether, the 
Paris Agreement introduces new and nuanced forms of differential treatment,290 including for 
Least Developed Countries and small island developing states.291 
Although it does not provide any concrete or enforceable requirements that BCAs should 
adhere to, international climate change law does point to the need for introducing some form of 
favorable treatment for developing countries, and particularly Least Developed Countries.  This 
could be achieved in several ways.  First, BCAs imposed by developed countries could eschew 
any requirement for developing countries to adopt the same regulatory programs, programs that 
have a comparable mitigation effect (i.e., emission reductions),292 or ask for similar technology or 
regulatory standards.293  Second, groups of developing countries (e.g., Least Developed Countries 
or countries with de minimis greenhouse gas emissions) could be altogether exempted from the 
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BCA.  Third, differential benchmarks might be used to calculate the adjustment level.294  Finally, 
revenues from BCAs can be channeled back to developing countries, for instance to financially 
support climate change activities in these countries.295 
There are a range of ways in which the design and application of a BCA can therefore 
ensure conformity with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.  Yet 
implementing some of these options can result in tensions with the non-discrimination obligations 
under the GATT, and notably risk a violation of the most-favored nation requirement.  However, 
the need to ensure flexibility to take into account the conditions prevailing in other countries under 
the chapeau of GATT Article XX offers an opportunity to align the requirements of both regimes 
with respect to BCAs. 
VI. PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BCA DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Overview 
Sometime during the second half of the century, the Paris Agreement with its embedded logic of 
progressive climate ambition and stated objective of net zero emissions should result in global 
convergence of mitigation efforts.  As discussed in Part II, however, domestic climate action will 
remain characterized by heterogeneity in the near term.  In Part III, we showed that, among 
unilateral measures to level uneven carbon constraints, BCAs are the only ones to offer both 
effective protection against leakage and an incentive for other countries to strengthen their efforts.  
Still, they are politically controversial and administratively demanding,296 and their compatibility 
with international trade law is uncertain.  Based on the foregoing analysis of legal literature and 
case law, as well as existing case studies and proposals, the following subsections outline a BCA 
design that strikes a balance between legal durability, ease of implementation, and environmental 
performance. 
B. Scope and Coverage 
Any BCA has to determine its scope and coverage, that is, specify the products and trade flows 
affected by it, the sectors or geographies it applies to, and the types of carbon constraints it adjusts 
for.  A number of design considerations emerge from the literature and case law. 
1. Imports v. Exports 
Although economic research has suggested that applying a BCA to both imports and exports can 
increase its effectiveness in preventing leakage (see Part III.C), its scope should be limited to 
imports.  Doing so hedges against classification as a prohibited export subsidy under the SCM 
Agreement,297 and avoids setting an incentive for domestic producers to increase the carbon 
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intensity of exports, which could potentially result in an emission increase (see Part V.A.3).  Even 
with this limitation, a BCA on imports will still secure a majority of its potential benefits.298 
2. Sectoral Coverage 
Including only products from sectors with high carbon cost and trade exposure as well as limited 
ability to pass through the cost to consumers greatly reduces the administrative and technical 
burden of any BCA299 while still delivering significant environmental benefits.300  Such sectors 
include cement, steel, and aluminum, where the value of embodied carbon products, as a 
percentage of value added, tends to be relatively high compared with manufactured products.301  
By ensuring that the BCA only covers sectors where inclusion affords clear environmental 
benefits, this narrow scope helps meet the conditions set out in Article XX of the GATT, and 
notably the need to meet the necessity test under Article XX(b) (see Part V.A.2.a).  Such coverage 
should also be useful at a political level, as the affected sectors tend to be influential domestic 
constituencies, yet their inclusion does not cause a strong shift in the terms of trade to the detriment 
of developing countries.302 
Determination of these sectors can build on established criteria and thresholds already in 
use in several jurisdictions, and should be accompanied by ex ante studies to identify vulnerable 
sectors and possible downstream impacts.  Typically, the inclusion threshold will be defined as a 
combined metric of carbon intensity, calculated as the emission levels and compliance cost in a 
sector relative to its value added, and trade intensity, measured as the value of imports and exports 
in a sector relative to total production plus imports.303  Together, these two criteria can help 
establish whether the carbon price will substantially raise production costs, and whether 
competition on international markets will prevent passing through these cost increases to 
consumers without resulting in substitution by foreign products. 
3. Geographic Scope 
To ensure observance of Article I of the GATT and prevent avoidance (“trans-shipment”) 
strategies by importers,304 the BCA should opt for a sectoral focus and avoid exempting entire 
countries based on country-specific attributes, such as domestic climate policies or participation 
in a common climate agreement.305  Exempting countries can also risk that flows of carbon-
intensive goods shift to and through such countries.  Uniform application to all countries would 
compromise the leveraging effect of a BCA, however, and be at odds with the principle of common 
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but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the climate regime and the special 
and differential treatment provisions of the trade regime.  This is particularly important because 
undifferentiated application of a BCA would disproportionately affect developing countries.306  
Although desirable, therefore, differentiation should be based on differences in the carbon content 
of products, not their country of origin.  A way to introduce differentiation without introducing a 
link to any specific country is to give foreign producers an opportunity to demonstrate the actual 
climate performance of their products, thereby averting the imposition of the BCA or reducing the 
adjustment level (see below, Part VI.B.5). Moreover, an exemption of Least Developed 
Countries—who contribute only minimally to global emissions—can be reconciled with the 
environmental objective of the BCA, would find legal support in principles applied both in the 
international trade and climate regimes (see Parts V.A.1.c and V.B), and has been a consistent 
feature in past policy proposals.307 
4. Policy Coverage 
Determining a differential in ambition is easiest with policies that create an explicit carbon price, 
rendering the latter a natural starting point for a BCA.  Less than 20 percent of global emissions 
are currently covered by an explicit price on carbon, however, and price levels tend to be 
significantly lower than the cost of compliance with other non-price carbon constraints.308  Over 
time, as data and methodologies improve, a BCA could seek to adjust for the differential between 
effective carbon prices faced by domestic and foreign producers in a sector, including both explicit 
and implicit carbon prices (see Part VI.C).  Inclusion of policies addressing carbon dioxide 
emissions would already capture a significant share of emissions associated with imported 
products, although extension to policies for emissions of other relevant gases and black carbon, 
converted using accepted global warming potential metrics, could be pursued to successively 
increase the efficiency of the BCA.  Policy coverage has implications for the applicable provisions 
of the GATT (see Part V.A.1). 
5. Carbon Content 
Because BCAs adjust for differences in embedded carbon and applicable carbon constraints, they 
also have to include a decision on the scope of included emissions and a methodology to calculate 
those emissions. 
a. Emissions Scope and Benchmarks 
Applying a BCA requires first determining (or estimating) the amount of embodied carbon in a 
given product.  The carbon content of a product can be determined by calculating the emissions 
from the production process, which involves emissions from energy inputs such as electricity and 
heat, as well as emissions from the production process itself.  Ideally, this determination would 
occur at each production facility based on actual emissions.309  But direct emissions measurement 
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is not always practicable, and may face legal challenges.310  Therefore, measures such as a BCA 
will generally be based on standardized benchmarks serving as a proxy for the carbon intensity of 
products, with the benchmark values reflecting average performance, best available technology, 
or worst available technology in a sector, either at a national, regional, or global level. 
For the BCA design proposed here, limiting the scope of emissions to those originating 
from the production process itself as well as emissions from electricity and heat generated offsite 
and used as inputs for production will cover a majority of relevant emissions without unduly 
adding to technical complexity.  Direct and indirect emissions should be determined using different 
methodologies: 
 Global average sectoral benchmarks for direct emissions:  For direct emissions from 
production, the Carbon Inclusion Mechanism proposal of 2009 (Part IV.A) envisioned 
focusing on sectors instead of countries, and thereby reducing the link to specific country 
attributes that might have given rise to accusations of discrimination under GATT Article 
I (see Part V.A.1.b).  Applying the global average emissions intensity of sectors affected 
by a BCA on imports strikes a balance between legal concerns about a country focus, 
broader fairness considerations, and the need to provide a sustained incentive for continued 
emission reductions.  Multiple benchmarks may be needed in some sectors to reflect 
different production technologies. 
 Regional emission factors for indirect emissions:  Indirect emissions from electricity and 
heat generated offsite should be included, provided they are also subject to a carbon 
constraint domestically.  Because energy is often traded across national borders, and 
interconnected electricity markets do not always follow political boundaries, determination 
of indirect emissions should be based on average grid emission factors in electricity 
markets rather than national averages.  Again, applying this approach helps avoid a legally 
problematic link to country-specific characteristics, and also better represents the local 
characteristics of energy supply. 
In the absence of suitable or accurate data, a jurisdiction imposing a BCA could also base the 
determination of embedded carbon on the average direct and indirect emissions intensity of its 
own domestic goods.311  Past policy proposals, such as the 2007 Future Allowance Import 
Requirement and the 2009 Carbon Inclusion Mechanism proposals (see Part IV.A), avoided 
technical complexity and legal risk by basing the calculation of embedded carbon on the average 
carbon intensity of domestic goods. 
As aggregate values, however, standardized benchmarks will invariably fail to represent 
the emissions performance of individual emitters accurately.  Foreign producers should therefore 
be afforded a transparent, accessible process to document actual emissions with third-party-
verified data, and thereby demonstrate that their carbon intensity is lower than a sectoral average 
benchmark.312  Importantly, that option introduces a permissible element of differentiation, which 
contributes to the leveraging purpose of the BCA and incentivizes mitigation in exporting 
countries.  It can also raise administrative challenges and strain capacities of some affected trading 
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partners,313 justifying allocation of some or all of the revenue to foreign capacity building efforts.  
A more ambitious – but, given current political realities, probably unattainable – option would 
involve creating a joint body under the WTO and the UNFCCC to develop a common international 
standard for the calculation of the carbon content of goods, coupled with a waiver for certain trade 
restrictive climate policies based on embodied carbon.314 
b. Data Sources 
A growing number of multi-regional input-output databases315 and ongoing projects such as the 
Carbon Loophole project316 provide continuously improving datasets for the determination of 
carbon embedded in internationally traded goods.  Likewise, increasing granularity of life cycle 
and life cycle sustainability assessmentapproaches317 and standardization of methodologies for 
quantification of the carbon footprint of products318 are helping provide a more robust body of data 
for BCA implementation.  Accounting of emissions associated with consumption is now published 
consistently for a number of countries, and may eventually become a standard component of 
national environmental accounts.319 
C. Adjustment Level 
Once embedded emissions have been calculated, the level of adjustment needs to be determined, 
factoring in any exemptions and rebates afforded to domestic producers.  As a default, the 
adjustment will be based on the sectoral benchmark multiplied by an explicit carbon price and the 
amount of product, which, in the case of a variable carbon price (e.g., in an emissions trading 
system), can be averaged across a specified period.  Where no explicit carbon price exists, or the 
importing jurisdiction has introduced multiple complementary instruments in the covered sector, 
determination of the net policy differential is considerably more difficult.  In such situations, we 
suggest identifying the effective carbon price in that sector, and multiplying it by the relevant 
benchmark. 
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An effective carbon price is the sum of explicit and implicit carbon prices under applicable 
carbon constraints, and is based on the notion that even policies which do not generate an explicit 
carbon price—such as a carbon tax or emissions trading system—still impose a compliance cost 
on covered emitters, based on their marginal abatement cost and the mandated level of emission 
reductions, as well as a cost to society.320  Determining the effective carbon price applicable to a 
given sector, that is, the sum of can build on existing methodologies, for instance by correlating 
energy taxes with the carbon content of the underlying fuels, identifying the average sectoral 
abatement cost and multiplying it by mandated emission reductions, or using economic models to 
identify the carbon price needed to achieve mandated emission reductions in a sector.321 
Importantly, the BCA is only meant to adjust for the differential between the foreign and 
domestic climate policy cost in covered sectors.  For that reason, the level of the BCA has to reflect 
any exemptions, rebates or free allocation in the importing country, as well as carbon constraints 
applied to imports in their country of origin, all of which are then deducted these from the 
determined level in order to comply with the non-discrimination principle of GATT Article III 
(see Part V.A.1.b).  As with the calculation of embedded emissions, moreover, each exporting 
emitter should be given an opportunity to submit third-party-verified data on marginal abatement 
cost under all applicable carbon constraints.  A transparent and impartial process involving 
independent third parties or an international body could help avoid political or judicial challenges. 
D. Revenue Use 
Rather than accrue to the general budget or be recycled to the public, any revenue collected through 
the application of a BCA can be used to further its environmental objective and benefit developing 
countries affected by it.  To that end, revenue can be partly or entirely allocated to developing 
countries in order to support domestic climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts as well as 
build capacity on measurement, reporting, and verification, ultimately favoring the emergence of 
a more homogenous climate landscape.  Designed this way, a BCA can result in net financial flows 
to beneficiary countries322 while measurably contributing to the climate finance obligations of 
implementing countries.  Although this can weaken the domestic benefits of introducing a BCA,323 
it avoids shifting a disproportionate burden on developing countries and being inconsistent with 
the differential treatment rules under the climate and trade regimes (see Part V.A.1.c and V.B).  
Additionally, it strengthens the nexus to legitimate policy objectives required under GATT Article 
XX(b) and (g).  Internationally, moreover, this can lower the likelihood of political or legal 
challenges against the BCA, and has parallels in international law, for instance under the 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol.324 
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E. Expiration 
Instruments that generate revenue can become entrenched even after their primary objective has 
long been achieved.  To avert that risk, a BCA should expect to be temporary in nature, and contain 
a sunset clause prescribing its expiration unless its extension is expressly warranted to counteract 
emission leakage.  More generally, while demand for BCAs–and indeed their political viability–
are likely to increase in the medium term, BCAs are not a desirable and stable framework for 
climate action in the long run, as a scenario with multiple BCAs operating in parallel would incur 
considerable administrative complexity.325  Given their leveraging effect, they ideally prompt their 
own obsolescence.  As countries gradually expand and deepen their domestic climate policy 
frameworks, the need to adjust for policy differentials subsides, and with it the utility of a BCA. 
F. Process 
To improve political acceptance and the odds of passing legal muster, the design and 
implementation of a BCA should occur through a deliberate process that ensures fairness, 
transparency, and predictability, and that provides opportunities for participation by affected 
countries as well as appellate and review procedures (see Part V.A.2.c).  Serious and inclusive 
negotiations, conducted in good faith, should precede the application of a BCA and aim to reduce 
the differential in carbon constraints that raise concerns of leakage.  Such bi- or multilateral 
engagement is critical to evade assumptions of protectionism.  Because individual climate efforts 
remain within the discretion of each individual party rather than being centrally negotiated, with 
policy heterogeneity a sanctioned feature of the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement 
may not be enough to satisfy this requirement. 
As suggested in the proposed BCA for the European cement sector (see Part IV.A), 
moreover, introduction of the BCA and subsequent extension to additional sectors should ideally 
be informed by ex ante impact studies which also consider the effects on the downstream sectors.  
Actual implementation should then be preceded by an early announcement and sufficient lead time 
to maximize the leveraging effect of the BCA on other countries and afford them adequate time to 
prepare and implement more ambitious climate action of their own.326 
G. Measures in the Trade Regime  
So far, all design recommendations have taken the doctrines and provisions of the international 
trade regime as a given.  In effect, however, the body of rules constituting the WTO legal system 
are themselves a dynamic product of negotiation, and thus not immutable.  A country or coalition 
of countries looking to implement a BCA could therefore request clarification of the legal 
conditions and implications within the WTO or a subset of affected countries.  Although such a 
step could increase legal certainty and coherence across regimes, the required political 
endorsement will be difficult to secure,327 as evidenced by an earlier—and ultimately fruitless—
attempt by Singapore to launch a discussion of BCAs in the WTO Committee on Trade and 
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Environment.328 In the current climate of multilateral gridlock and trade hostilities (see Part II), 
securing an agreement may be all but impossible, yet we still outline the options as a potential 
perspective for the longer term and a changed political context. 
At an informal level, a country or group of countries preparing to introduce a BCA could 
pursue several measures related to process and institutional cooperation, such as improved 
procedures for deliberation and knowledge transfer between the trade and climate regimes, 
mandatory assessment of climate impacts in the context of trade policy reviews, or enhanced 
transparency through notification and review practices and information repositories. 
Additionally, the could pursue a number of more formal options to shape the trade regime 
or obtain legal certainty for BCAs, including, in the order of scope and ambition:329 
 Seeking an amendment of relevant WTO rules to affirm the permissibility of a BCA, either 
positively through inclusion or negatively through exemption from affected trade 
disciplines. Such an amendment would be conditional on the approval of at least two-thirds 
of WTO Members,330 and has therefore been rarely achieved in practice; 
 One such amendment—subject to the same procedural requirement—could see inclusion 
of a moratorium or “peace clause,” pursuant to which WTO Members would wait before 
challenging national climate measures, or refrain from using countermeasures that restrict 
trade or otherwise have trade effects in WTO dispute settlement; 
 A high approval threshold also applies to temporary waivers of WTO obligations, which 
can be adopted by under “exceptional circumstances” by a three-quarters majority of 
members.331  Such a waiver could, for instance, allow trade discrimination based on carbon 
content, coupled with an assurance of mutual restraint.  Given their temporary nature, 
waivers have proven somewhat more amenable to passage. 
 An authoritative interpretation of relevant provisions in the GATT and other WTO 
Agreements, stating, for instance, that a BCA falls within the scope of Article XX of the 
GATT, would likewise require a three-quarters majority of WTO members.332 
 Finally, another approach would be to modify the product classification system used in 
trade negotiations, the World Custom Organization’s Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System, in order to account for different processes and production methods.333 
Despite employing different formal and procedural channels, these options have in common some 
form of affirmation that BCAs are in compliance with WTO obligations, thereby preempting 
judicial proceedings and offering a more predictable context for implementation of a BCA.  While 
this justifies their appeal, any steps to newly calibrate the balance between trade and climate policy 
would also have to ensure it does not create a defense for excessive protectionism. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Under the Paris Agreement, climate cooperation has become broader, and is expected to deepen 
over time.  For the time being, however, domestic climate efforts remain heterogeneous and 
asymmetrical, elevating concerns about emissions leakage and competitiveness impacts in the 
political debate.  BCAs can help level uneven carbon constraints, and are the only unilateral policy 
option that offers both effective protection against leakage and an incentive for other countries to 
strengthen their climate efforts.  Based on a survey of the academic literature, relevant case law, 
and practical case studies, this article has outlined a BCA design that seeks to balance legal risks, 
environmental efficacy, and political and administrative feasibility. 
Still, the general parameters proposed in this article cannot avoid some remaining legal 
uncertainties.  While the proposed design can lower the likelihood of infringing GATT Articles I 
and III, it also improves the prospects for a successful defense under the exceptions of Article XX. 
Affording the appropriate weight to avoidance of discrimination and differentiation, and ensuring 
a fair, inclusive and transparent process, should help a BCA prove resilient to legal challenges 
under international trade law.  Moreover, the revenue it would generate can serve to accelerate 
climate action in trade partners, and can also be used to help lower political resistance. 
If successful, the need for BCAs should wane over time, as climate ambition across trading 
partners converges and any BCAs in place address diminishing leakage rates.  Given their 
complexity and tradeoffs, BCAs are neither a desirable nor stable option for global climate action 
in the long run.  Collective climate action at the required level of stringency will always remain 
preferable over unilateral efforts, even with BCAs.  But under the climate regime established by 
the Paris Agreement, such convergence will take time, and time is currently of the essence.  If 
BCAs are able to remove even one of the many barriers to more ambitious climate action and 
thereby accelerate this convergence, the residual risks and trade-offs associated with their use may 
be a price worth paying. 
 
